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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: WESTERN INTERESTS I N  CHINA AND JAPAN 
This t h e s i s  a t tempts  t o  examine seve ra l  aspec t s  of 
B r i t i s h  r e l a t i o n s  with China and Japan dur i rq  t he  period 
beginning August 1938 and ending i n  March 1939. 
The Int roduct ion is  concerned with a br ie f  ana lys i s  
of t h e  B r i t i s h  economic pos i t i on  i n  China and Japan, coupled 
with a hr ief  o u t l i n e  of per t inen t  events p r i o r  t o  August 
1938. The sources used f o r  t h i s  Introductory segment w i l l  
be pr imar i ly  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  secondary sources. However p r l -  
mary source mate r ia l  w i l l  be used as the basis of the  bal- 
ance of the  paper. This mate r ia l  being an edi ted  co l l ec t ion  
of messages s e n t  between t h e  Foreign Office and the  Bmbassa- 
dors  t o  Japan and China. 
Five aspec t s  of B r i t i s h  policy w i l l  be examined i n  
d e t a i l .  The f i r s t  of these  being t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of and 
reasons f o r  t he  var ious  arguments as t o  whether Br i t i sh  a i d  
should be extended t o  China or whether a course of r e t a l i a -  
t o ry  a c t i o n  aga ins t  Japan should be embarked upon. The 
following chapter ,  then,  examines t h e  quest ion of whether 
B r i t i s h  ac t ions  followed those of the  United S t a t e s  or led. 
This of course Is done only with reference t o  t he  Br i t i sh  
point  of view. The t h i r d  aspect  of Br i t i sh  policy t o  be 
examined is  whether Br i t a in  a c t u a l l y  w a s  t r ea t ed  l e s s  wel l  
a t  t h e  hands of Japan, as the  Br i t i sh  contended, than was 
2 
ehe Uhited S ta tes .  The last two top ic s  d e a l  with t h e  Ambas- 
sadors themselves. One chapter examines t he  gradual  change, 
and its a t tendant  reasons and consequences, i n  t h e  views of 
t he  Ambassador t o  Japan as regards  W i t i s h  policy toward 
t h a t  country. The following chapter being devoted t o  a 
study of the  conf l i c t ing  views and t h e i r  basis, of the  
Ambassadors t o  Japan and China concerning the  B r i t i s h  a t t i -  
tude toward the  two combatant nations. 
In  turning t o  any discuss ion of t h e  B r i t i s h  pos i t ion  
i n  t h e  Far E a s t  Jus t  p r i o r  t o  World War 11, It is wel l  t o  
remember t h a t  t h e  degree of B r i t i s h  pa r t i c ipa t ion  i n  Far  
Eastern  events necessar i ly  r e f l ec t ed  t h e  s t a t e  of th ings  i n  
Western Europe. The f i r s t  concern of Br i t a in  w a s  of course 
the  s ecu r i t y  of t he  B r i t i s h  I s l e s  and of t he  sea  lanes upon 
which she depended f o r  foodstuffs  and raw materials .  Thus 
her  s t r eng th  i n  any one pa r t  of the  globe depended d i r e c t l y  
upon t h e  demands made upon her  s t reng th  i n  o ther  pa r t s  of 
the  globe. 
Japan's s t r eng th  lay  i n  t he  f a c t  t h a t  her  i n t e r e s t s  
and forces  were ooncentrated i n  the  Pac i f i c  a r ea ,  with 
nothing t h a t  oould d i s t r a c t  from t h e i r  maintenance. The 
pos i t ion  of Br i t a in  was, of course, exact ly  the  ,opposite. 
Japan's weakness w a s  her  excessive dependence upon overseas 
markets f o r  not only near ly  a l l  types  of raw mater ia ls  but 
3 
a l s o  l a r g e  amounts of machines and r e l a t e d  products. This 
then made t h e  problem of fo re lgn  exchange pa r t i cu l a r ly  
c r u c i a l ,  
During t h e  f i r s t  f i v e  months of t h e  1937 war with 
China, Japan had used up nearly one-eighth of her  t o t a l  
rese rves  of gold and f oreign s e c u r i t  i e s ,  he r  specie reserves 
. 2  being a l ready v i r t u a l l y  exhausted, Only from the  United 
S t a t e s  o r  B r i t a i n  could Japan g e t  t he  c r e d i t s  o r  loans 
needed t o  s u s t a i n  her  economy, s ince  ne i the r  I t a l y  nor 
Germany, her  par tners  i n  t he  Anti-Comintern Pact,  could do 
more than arrange b a r t e r  agreements due t o  t h e i r  own short-  
ages of fore lgn exchange. 3 
During t h e  mid-1930's t he  B r i t i s h  examined t h e  possi- 
b i l i t y  of r e s t r a in ing  Japen by means of economic pressure 
but concluded t h a t  the  col laborat ion of the  United S t a t e s  
4 
was e s s e n t i a l  t o  t he  success of any such policy. Further- 
more, any such polioy would not have been Immediately deci- 
s i v e ,  but might have provoked Japan t o  take retaliatory 
ac t ion .  5 
1 T. A. Bisson, China (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1938). p. 
2 ~ b l d . ,  - pp. 342-343. 
4 W. N. Medlicott ,  Histor  of the  Second World War 
--F (Vol. I of United K i  dom Civl ~ ~ 1 ~ t E c o n o r n l c  ~ K k a d e ,  
ed. V. K. Hancock.*n: H i s  ~ a j e s t -  Sta t lonary  Cf'f i ce  
and Longmans, Green and Co., 1952). p. 384. 
The a reas  i n  which the  majority of Anglo-Japanese 
conf l i c t s  i n  China arose  were the  Concessions and Se t t l e -  
ments which were semi-independent municipalities which were 
under the  sovereignty, but not the  control ,  of China. Their 
control  extended w e r  police,  roads, buildings, s an i t a t ion  
and taxes. While they could i s sue  municipal regulat ions ,  
they d id  not have cour ts  of t h e i r  own, but Instead depended 
upon Chinese courts  and Consular and other foreign t r ibuna ls .  
In  times of c i v i l  w a r ,  they maintained t h e i r  neu t r a l i t y  and 
were regarded as l e g a l  asylums f o r  p o l i t i c a l  refugees from 
1 
other pa r t s  of' China. Settlements, of which only two 
ex is ted ,  one a t  Shanghai and one an the  is land of Kulangsu 
a t  Amoy, were a reas  i n  which a l l  t h e  Treaty powers held 
eqm1 r igh t s .  Concessions, of which the  Br i t i sh  had three 
i n  1938 (at Canton, Tients ln  and Newchwang), were areas  of 
spec ia l  p r iv i lege  granted t o  only one nation. 
In the  summer of 1937 Br i t a in  w a s  preoccupied with 
the  Spanish Civ i l  War and the  tension prevail ing In  the 
Mediterranean a s  wel l  as German rearmament. It  was during 
t h a t  time, July 7, 1937, t h a t  t he  undeclared war between 
China and Japan f l a r e d  up anew with the  incident  a t  
Lukouchiao. 
The car of t he  B r i t i s h  Ambassador i n  China was s u b  
'Harold S. Qulgley and George H. Blakeslee, - The Far 
East An In te rna t  lona l  Survey ( Boaton : World Peace ~ o u n z  
-
t i o n . 7 9 3 8 ) .  p. 156. 
Jected on August 26, 1937 t o  a Japanese machine-gun and 
bombing a t t ack .  Br i t a in ,  a f t e r  basing i t 's  requests  f o r  
apologies not  upon diplomatic immunities but ins tead upon 
those of non-combatants, w a s  given a somewhat perfunctory 
expression of regre t .  1 
In September 1937 the  Japanese announced t h a t  the  
e n t i r e  China coast was closed t o  Chinese shipping, and i n  
add i t i on  t h a t  ve s se l s  of fo re ign  powers might be subject  t o  
inspect ion of t h e i r  papers. The B r i t i s h  acquiesced provided 
t h a t  c e r t a i n  condit ions were s a t i s f i e d ,  while the  United 
2 S t a t e s  refused the  r i g h t  of Japan t o  s t o p  i t 's  ships.  
Shor t ly  t h e r e a f t e r  t he  Yangtze River was closed t o  fore ign 
vesse l s .  
An appeal  by China t o  t he  Uague of Nations i n  
September 1937 r e su l t ed  i n  a conference of the  Signator ies  
of the  Nine-Power Treaty, t he  i n v i t a t i o n  of which Japan 
r e Jec t ed ,  being held a t  Brussels In  November. This confer- 
ence a f t e r  urging the  suspension of h o s t i l i t i e s ,  ended In  
3 
f a i l u r e .  The League, I n  addi t ion,  I n  both October 1937 and 
' ~ a r o l d  S. Quigley, Far Eastern War 1 37-1941 
( Boston : World Peace Found~o-);5(.,&.- 
2 ~ i l l i a m  C. Johnstone, - The United S t a t e s  and Ja n f s  
N e w  Order ( N e w  York: Oxford Vniverslty Press, lm), p. 9 . 
- -7
3~ Study Group of t he  Royal I n s t i t u t e  of In ternat ional  
A f f a i r s ,  P o l i t i c a l  and S t r a t e  i c  I n t e r e s t s  of the United 
K i  dom An Outline m n d o r d  U n l v e r s ~ y ~ e ~ ~ 9 ) .  ng- 
6 
February 1938 urged i t s  Individual members t o  explore the  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of a set t lement,  and, of extending a i d  t o  
China. 
In  two separate incidents on the  Yangtze, December 12, 
1937, both American and B r i t  i s h  mi l i t a ry  c r a f t  were attacked 
by Japanese land and air  forces. The American Naval Court 
of Inquiry f e l t  t h a t  t he  inoident had not been an accident.  1 
Further confirming t h i s  view, the  l o c a l  Japanese o f f i c i a l s  
i n  response t o  demands f o r  an explanation t o l d  the  B r i t i s h  I 
Consul-General i n  Nanking, t h a t  orders t o  f i r e  upon a l l  
sh ips  on the  r i v e r  had been given. Tokyo, denying the  abave 
statement, made perfunctory apologies t o  Br i ta in  while 
evadinq r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  the  incident.  This treatment 
contrasted sharply with t h a t  accorded the  United S ta tes  
which had immediately received a n  expression of r eg re t  
2 
followed shor t ly  by a cash ihdernnity. 
The worsening Br i t i sh  posi t ion was demonstrated by 
the  r e s u l t s  of the  1937 Shanghai Settlement Municipal elec- 
t i ons  which indiaated t h a t  within a shor t  time the  voting 
s t rength  of the constantly increasing Japanese population 
would be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  supplant t he  dominance which B r i t i s h  
subjects  then, as i n  the  past ,  exercised i n  Settlement 
' ~ a r l e y  Farmworth Machair and Donald F. Lach. Modern 
Far  Eastern In te rna t iona l  Relations (New York: D. Van 
Nost-., Inc. ,  19501, pp. 528-529. 
 bid., - pp. 529-530. 
1 
a f f a i r s .  The Settlement a t  t h a t  time w a s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a 
B r i t i s h  control led c i t y  with a l l  Important administrat ive 
posi t ions  held by B r i t i s h  subjects .  
With t he  occupation of Shanghai i n  Nooelnber 1937 * not 
only was t h e  In te rna t iona l  Settlement surrounded with r i g i d  
r e s t r l c t l o n s  being placed upon the  residence and movement of 
2 persons and property but a l s o  the  equipment of the Whangpoo 
Conservancy Board, which was responsible f o r  dredging the  
Whangpoo River channel thereby keeping the  acoess t o  
Shanghai Harbor navigable, was seized and retained.  3 
Throughout 1938 Japanese pressure w a s  exerted t o  a l t e r  the  
s t a t u s  and administrat ion of the  Settlement. Seizure of 
these f orelgn r e s i d e n t i a l  areas  would have both destroyed 
the  las t  r e l a t i v e l y  sa fe  base f o r  foreign a c t i v i t i e s  and i n  
addi t ion  probably r e su l t ed  i n  fu r the r  ourtailment of foreign 
4 
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  occupied areas.  
A s  i n  the  Settlement, the Japanese throughout 1938 
continued t o  t i gh ten  t h e i r  hold over Br i t i sh  i n t e r e s t s  and 
concessions i n  widely sca t te red  pa r t s  of China. The con- 
cessions themselves were often used I n  numerous ways by both 
Chinese and Br i t i sh  t o  the  disadvantage of the  Japanese. 5 
With the  Japanese se izure  of t he  northern and eastern  
31bid.. - pp. 111-113. 4 ~ b i d .  - , pp. 48-49. 
%laonair and Lach, 2. - c i t . .  p. 109. 
dis t r i c t s  of t h e  Shanghai In t e rna t iona l  Settlement i n  August 
1937, t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of customs d u t i e s  on Japanese goods 
1 landed i n  t h i s  a r e a  w a s  e f f ec t ive ly  eliminated. This s i t u -  
a t i o n  continued although t h e  Japanese reached a n  agreement 
i n  m y  1938 with t he  B r i t i s h  under which a l l  customs 
revenues co l lec ted  i n  occupied a r e a s  would be deposited i n  
t h e  Yokohoma Specie Bank, which w a s  t o  remit  t he  amounts 
necessary t o  f u l l y  s e rv i ce  fo re ign  loans and indemnities 
secured on t h i s  revenue. This agreement however never came 
i n t o  fo rce  s ince  the  Chinese refused t o  authorize t he  
2 
r e l e a s e  of t he  Japanese Boxer Indemnity quotas. Thus by 
t h e  spr ing  of 1938 every por t  i n  North China w a s  i n  Japanese 
hands, with customs du t i e s ,  which t o t a l l e d  over 60 per cent 
of the Chlnese customs revenue being col lec ted and held by 
Japanese agents.  
3 
Canton, with t h e  f a l l  of Shanghai, became t h e  pr inci -  
pa l  por t  of en t ry  f o r  the  National Government u n t i l  sho r t l y  
a f t e r  the  Munich Conference when it too w a s  captured and 
thereupon immediately followed by t h e  closure of t he  Pear l  
River. This a c t i o n  not  only ha l ted  t h e  flow of mi l i t a ry  
suppl ies  t o  China and endangered the  food supply of Hong 
I Johnstone, 2. - c i t . ,  p. 109. 
2 ~ .  L. Woodward and Rohan Butler  (eds. ) ,  Documents - on 
B r i t i s h  Fore1 n Po l l c  191 -1 (London: H i s  Ma jestyts 
E Z € G i i e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ h # s e r ~ e s  vol .  VIII ,  p. 14. 
'shun- sin Chou, The Chlnese Inf la t  ion 1937-1949 ( N e w  
York: Columbia ~ i v e r s i t y p r ~ 9 6 3 ) .  p. 43. 
Kong, but a l s o  rendered the B r i t i s h  and Prench Concessions 
1 
a t  Canton of l i t t l e  value. 
The economic and commercial s t ruc tu re  of cen t r a l  and 
nor theastern  China was organized t o  include a l l  forms of 
2 
communication and industry. It w a s  cap i ta l ized  and 
d i r ec t ed  by new companies, i n  which Japan held half the  
stock,  with ul t imate au thor i ty  r e s t ing  with the China 
Affa i r s  Board, which was created In  Tomo December 16, 1938. 
The various companies were grouped as subsld1arles under two 
large holding companies, the  North China Developement 
Company and t h e  Central China Developement Company, which 
were themselves organized In  May and June of 1938, respec- 
t i ve ly .  
3 
Japan a f t e r  Incorporating Manchukuo In  a yen-block 
arrangement I n  1935, which f a c i l i t a t e d  t rade  through f r ee ly  
exchangeable currencies,  decided t o  expand t h i s  arrangement 
i n  1938 t o  Include as much of China as possible. This was 
done when the Peking Pruvislonal Government announced on 
March 10 the  establishment of t h e  Federal Reserve Bank of 
China, which proceeded t o  issue a new currency t h a t  was 
designed t o  supplant the  ourrency of t he  Chinese National 
J. Quigley, op. c l t . ,  - 
L Paul Hibbert Clyde, ---- The P a r  East A H i s t o r  of the  
d n n c ~  Im c t  of the  West on Eastern A s i a  (New Yor 
e I f i ~ . ; - 1 9 % ~  '- 
I Johnstone, 9. G., p. 156. 
10 
Government. These notes, which were widely circulated by 
the  Japanese and t h e i r  Chinese associates ,  were not accepted 
by the  masses or by the foreigners since they were not 
d i r e c t l y  convertible i n t o  foreign exohange. The existence 
of foreign concessions i n  Tients in  made possible the continued 
wide c i r cu la t ion  of t h e  Chinese currency and, moreover, when 
the  F.R.B. notes were used, they were generally discounted 7 
1 
t o  10 per cent. 
Throughout the summer and f a l l  of 1938 the  Five 
Ministers Conference, an inner cabinet composed of the  Prime 
Minister and Mlnisters f o r  Foreign Affairs ,  War, Marine and 
Finance, was held. It was during t h i s  tlme t h a t  it was 
decided t o  place most of the  functions of the  Foreign Off ice  
r e l a t i n g  t o  China i n  the  hands of a proposed China M f a i r s  
Board. Two other important issues which were discussed a t  
the  Conference were whether the  Anti-Cornintern Pact should 
be transformed i n t o  a f u l l  m i l i t a r y  a l l i ance ,  and, i f  the 
Pact should continue t o  apply only t o  Russia or be reevalu- 
2 
ated with reference t o  Bri ta in  and France. 
In turning t o  an accessment of the Br i t i sh  economic 
posi t ion in China, it is well t o  remember t h a t  although many 
of the  f igures  which a r e  used here ac tua l ly  were taken from 
l ~ b l d . ,  - pp. 147-148. 
A 
' Y A ~  e fhndee  Mmron, Contro l  of Jsmnese Forelnn 
seve ra l  years p r i o r  t o  1938, they were i n  most cases the  
only ones ava i lab le .  But I th ink  t h a t  f o r  the  purposes of 
t h i s  paper they do g ive  one an ind ica t ion  of the  t r ade  and 
f i n a n c i a l  pa t t e rns  which prevailed,  although these  by 1938 
had c e r t a i n l y  changed somewhat, owing i f  nothing e l s e  t o  t h e  
Slno-Japanese c o n f l i c t  . 
Tota l  B r i t i s h  investments I n  China i n  1931 were e s t i -  
mated t o  be about 2250 mil l ion  with approximately three-  
f i f t h s  of t h i s  being invested I n  the  In te rna t iona l  Se t t l e -  
1 2 
ment a t  Shanghai and one-tenth at Hong Kong. The invest- 
ments of Japan, which were located mainly i n  the  Manchurian 
reglon of China, by 1930 amounted t o  about A82.5  mi l l ion  
while t h e  Unlted S t a t e s  by con t ras t  had investments of only 
3 531.9 mlll lon.  In  terms of d o l l a r s ,  t he  t o t a l  Br i t i sh  
investment i n  China, including Hong Kong, i n  1931 can be 
broken i n t o  i ts  seve ra l  components. Of a t o t a l  investment 
amounting t o  963.4 mi l l ion  d o l l a r s ,  approximately 240 
mi l l ion  were concentrated i n  the  export-import business,  200 
mi l l ion  i n  real e s t a t e ,  170 mil l ion i n  manufacturing, 130 
1 Royal I n s t i t u t e  of In te rna t iona l  Affa i r s ,  9. - c l t . ,  
p. 211. 
1bld. 
-
3 ~ h i n a  Pro e r  Economic Geo ra h , Ports  and Communica- d- H n d b m e s s  prepared t i o n s ,  V ~ I  o t h e  Geograp 
b y e  Naval In te l l igence  Divis ion (Parkside Works, Zdinburgh : 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd .  Under au tho r i t y  of H. M. 
S ta t ionary  Office, 1945). p. 571. 
mill ion i n  Transportation, and with 115 mill ion being 
1 
invested i n  banking and finance. 
Br i t a in  i n  1931 held 36.7 per cent of the  t o t a l  of 
foreign investments i n  Qllna, including Manchuria. Japan 
being a very close second with 35.1 per cent, thereby leav- 
ing Russia and the  United Sta tes  with 8.4 per cent and 6.1 
2 
per cent respectively. A s  regards China's foreign loans In  
1931, Br i t i sh  investors were seoond only t o  Japan, holdinq 
36 per cent with the l a t t e r  holding 38 per cent. France and 
the  United S ta te s  again t r a i l e d  with 16.5 per cent and 7 per  
cent of the  t o t a l  respectively. 
3 
Br i ta in  i n  1936 was the source of approximately 11.7 
per cent of Chinese imports while the  United States  and 
Japan exported t o  China 19.64 per cent and 16.26 per cent of 
her  t o t a l  imports respectively. The share of Japan however 
should ac tua l ly  be somewhat la rger ,  since i n  1932 the 
Japanese began the  exclusion of Manchurian trade from the 
Chinese Customsf returns.  In addit ion,  i f  the Bri t ish  
Empire were taken as a whole, it supplied about 20 per cent 
of Chinese imports f o r  t h a t  year. 4 
'F'rederick V. Field (ed. ) , Eoonomic Handbook of the 
Pacif i c  Area (Garden Ci ty ,  New  orb: Doubleday, DOG 
n c X 9 3 4 ) .  f o r  The I n s t i t u t e  of Pacif i c  Relations, 
2 Ibld., p. 355. 
-
3Qulgley, 9. - o i t . ,  p. 36. 
'china Proper, Vol. 111. 9. - c i t . ,  p. 570. 
13 
During 1936 Br i t i sh  imports from China were only 9.18 
per cent of the l a t t e r ' s  t o t a l  exports,  a f igure  s ign i f i -  
cantly l e s s  than e i t h e r  the  United Sta tes  wfth 26.36 per 
1 
cent,  or Japan with 14.48 per cent. Trade with China 
amounted t o  approximately a0.3 mllllon thus const l tut lng 
approximately 1.5 per cent of t o t a l  B r i t i s h  exports and 0.45 
per cent of t o t a l  ~ r ' i t i s h  imports. Of t h i s  t o t a l  t rade ,  60 
2 
per cent passed through Shanghai. 
Br i t i sh  vessels  i n  1936 accounted for 39.5 per cent 
of the t o t a l  entrances and clearances a t  Chinese ports ,  w i th  
the Chinese, Japanese and Americans follawing w i t h  3.5 per 
cent,  17.2 per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively. Although 
the three leading countries accounted f o r  three-fourths of 
the  foreign shipping, they consti tuted 93 per cent of the  
coastwise sh ipping  i n  China. 3 
The bulk of B r i t i s h  investments i n  Japan, which i n  
4 
1930 t o t a l l e d a 3  mill ion or 1.79 per cent of her t o t a l  
world Investments, were i n  the form of government or private 
5 
corporative secur i t i e s .  The pr incipal  items by value i n  
the Japanese export and Import trade were t e x t i l e  goods, i n  
' ~ o ~ a l  I n s t i t u t e  of Internat ional  Affairs ,  2. - c l t  . , 
p. 210. 
3 China Proper, Vol. 111, 2. G., p. 591. 
4 
Field, 3. - c i t . ,  p. 344. 5 ~ b l d . ,  - p. 360. 
which Br i t a in  played a small ro le .  The United S ta t e s  
s n ~ ~ l i e d  the bulk of Japan's imports of cotton, machinery, 
i ron ,  s t e e l  and petroleum. 1 
As regards the  impact of t he  Sino-Japanese conf l i c t  
upon the  B r i t i s h  Diplomatic Mission8 In  both China and Japan 
during the  l a t t e r  pa r t  of 1938 and e a r l y  1939 It is of 
course obvious t h a t  the v o l a t i l e  European s i t u a t i o n  weighed 
heavily upon those i n  the  Foreign Off i c e  and upon any s o r t  
of ac t ions  t h a t  oould be undertaken i n  the  Pa r  Eastern area. 
It was precisely  during t h i s  period t h a t  the Japanese cap- 
tured Hankow and subsequently launched an  a t t a c k  In South 
China which r e su l t ed  i n  the  f a l l  of Canton with the r e su l t an t  
danger t o  the  i n t e r n a l  Chinese t rade of Hong Kong as well  a s  
the  bulk of Its food supply. 
The Japanese throughout the period continued t o  
harass Br i t l sh  i n t e r e s t s  i n  occupied a reas  through a va r i e ty  
of measures which proved t o  be qu i t e  r e s t r i c t i v e  t o  Br i t i sh  
t r ade  and business. These measures when subjected t o  the  
vigorous pro tes t s  of S i r  Roger Craigie, the  Br i t i sh  Ambassa- 
dor  i n  Tokyo, were general ly  held by the  Japanese Government 
t o  be necessary on the  grounds of mi l i t a ry  necessity. 
The B r i t i s h  were attempting t o  safeguard or preserve 
t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  i n  the  area  w i t h  such means as they had 
ava i lab le ,  t he  f a c t  t h a t  Br i ta in  could not successfully pro- 
tect her interests in both the Far Eastern and European 
spheres simultaneously being a foregone conclusion. Cralgie 
and Kerr, the British Ambassador to China, each saw the 
means to protect British interests In terms of the problems 
faced by them In their respective positions. In addition 
one should remember that Sir A. Clark Kerr was out of touoh 
with reliable communications during his periods of travel 
between the various widely dispersed centers of the Chinese 
National Gwernment and as a consequence was not always 
fully aware of all developments as they occurred. 
CHAPTER I1 
AIDING CHINA 'VERSUS RETALIATION AGAINST JAPAN: 
PROS AM) CONS 
BY August of 1938 t h e  B r i t i s h  had begun t o  r e a l i z e  
t h a t  it would be unwise t o  continue t h e i r  present policy 
whiah had consisted of t a lk ing  of a id ing  China, while i n  
a c t u a l i t y  withholding a i d  from her. This of course had the  
e f f e c t  of causing t h e  Chinese disappointment and a c e r t a i n  
l o s s  of hope, while i n  Japan the  impression created w a s  t h a t  
B r i t a i n  was aiding China more than she a c t u a l l y  w a s .  The 
r e s u l t  being t h a t  Br i t a in  uas gathering ill w i l l  from both 
s ides .  
A s  t he  Chinese began t o  doubt t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  con- 
t i nue  the  s t ruggle  without the a s s i s t ance  of Br i t a in  or some 
other  Power, and, as the  Japanese animosity toward Br i t a in  
continued unabated (indeed it began t o  increase)  it became 
pa infu l ly  obvious a change i n  policy w a s  needed. The 
B r i t i s h  were of course searching f o r  such a course of ac t i on  
as would have the  maximum desi red e f f e c t  with the minimum 
amount of r i s k  being incurred. Both, methods of a i d  t o  
China, as wel l  as methods of r e t a l i a t i o n  aga ins t  Japan were 
discussed. 
Throughout the  spring of 1938 the  Chinese Government 
had pressed the  B r i t i s h  Government for loans or c r e d i t s  
which t o t a l l e d  about 320 mill ion.  The B r i t i s h  Government 
being r e l u c t a n t  t o  become d i r e c t l y  involved i n  any scheme of 
a i d  t o  China, t he  Chinese Government was subsequently 
refused f i n a n c i a l  a i d  s ince  p r iva t e  B r i t i s h  Inves tors  d id  
no t  consider  the  Chinese s ecu r i t y  offered as adequate and 
t h e  Government would not guarantee t h e i r  secur i ty .  
This ac t i on ,  of course, disappointed t he  Chinese 
Gwernment, which considered i t s e l f  t o  badly need such a i d  
i f  it were t o  be ab l e  t o  continue t o  p ress  on with the  w a r .  
S i r  A.  Clark Kerr had been informed by Chiang Kai-shek t h a t  
i n  the  absence of such a i d  China would be forced t o  reeval- 
ua te  her  pos i t i on  vis-a-vis Great Br i ta in .  Kerr pointed out 
on August 5 t h a t ,  
It  is t o  be assumed t h a t  Chiang can only have meant 
t h a t  i f  no support  i s  t o  be go t  from us China would be 
forced t o  a s soc i a t e  herse l f  more c lose ly  with ~ u s s 1 a . l  
Noting t h e  a t t i t u d e  of the  Chinese Government as 
assessed by Kerr, Viscount Halifax, t he  Foreign Secretary,  
i n  e f f e c t  acknowledged the impending c r i s i s  of B r i t i s h  
pol icy  when he s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
. . . it appears that it would be unwise t o  
cher i sh  hopes t h a t  may have been h i t h e r t o  enter-  
t a ined  t h a t  h o s t i l i t i e s  would continue u n t i l  t h e  
Japanese had s o  far  exhausted themselves a s  t o  
become unable t o  give e f f e c t  t o  the ambitious plans 
they have i n  contemplation, the  e f f e c t  of which is 
l i k e l y  t o  be s o  det r imenta l  t o  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s .  
'woodward and Butler ,  9. G., p.  8. 
Apparently t h e  Chinese now f e e l  doubt about t h e i r  
a b i l i t y  t o  continue the  struggle.  
Kerr urged t h a t  Br i t i sh  policy should perhaps be 
reviewed when he s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
I should not l i k e  t o  see these  hopes khinese  
hopes of B r i t i s h  aid3 dashed f o r  good f o r  it would 
mean f i r s t l y ,  our f l inching from our Geneva under- 
taking and s l ipp ing  i n t o  t he  pos i t i on  merely of 
spec t a to r s  of t he  s t ruggle  and secondly, because I 
th ink  we have everything t o  ga in  by f r u s t r a t i o n  of 
Japanese e f f o r t  and everything t o  l o se  by i t ' s  
success.  2 
Craigie put t h e  shortcomings of t h e  present policy i n  
a n u t s h e l l  when he s t a t e d :  
Are we not . . . i n  danger of ge t t i ng  worst of 
both worlds - i n  Japan by creat ing impressions t h a t  
we a r e  doing more f o r  China than is ac tua l ly  t h e  
case and i n  China by causing disappointmen 
kind words a r e  not followed by good deeds? 5 
A s  Kerr had pointed out t he  bad e f f e c t  upon Chinese 
r e l a t i o n s  from t h e  B r i t i s h  r e f u s a l  of f i nanc i a l  ass i s tance  
t o  China, s o  a l s o  d id  Craigie point out t h a t ,  
. . . t h e  announcement bi July 26, 1938 t h a t  no 
B r i t i s h  a i d  t o  China would be forthcoming] undoubt- 
edly deprived m e  of a lever  here and f u r t h e r  announce- 
ments t h a t  s p e c i a l  legislatiofl 'would i n  any case become 
d e f i n i t e l y  necessary has given the Japa ese  an  unfortu- 
nate  sense of s ecu r i t y  i n  t h i s  respect .  r: 
He furthermore s t a t e d  t h a t  the Japanese Government had come 
t o  regard the ,  ". . . r i s k  of d i r e c t  fore ign pressure o r  
r e p r i s a l s  . . . as s l i g h t  . . . II 5 
4 Ibid. ,  p. 29. 
-
With t h e  need f o r  a change i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of 
B r i t i s h  pol icy  i n  t h e  a r ea  evident ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  began t o  
t u r n  over i n  t h e i r  minds the  var ious  courses of a c t i o n  which 
might be taken. However, a l l  courses contemplated were -1- 
anced aga ins t  t h e  probable Japanese reac t ion  and were sub- 
sequently discarded i f  considered t o  be t oo  r isky.  Halifax, 
on October 17 on the  subject  of a i d  t o  China, expressed t h i s  
wel l  uhen he s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
The p l a i n  f a c t  is t h a t  Ministers f e e l  unwilling a t  
t h i s  moment t o  take  any chances of provoking an inc i -  
dent  with t he  Japanese which would face  us with the  
choice of climbing down or  deple t ing our forces  i n  
European waters f o r  we a r e  not i n  a pos i t ion  effec-  
t i v e l y  t o  defend our i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  Far E a s t  a t  the  
moment, and t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  is bound t o  continue u n t i l  
t h e  pos i t i on  i n  Europe l ightens  o r  we a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
rearmed t o  enable u s  t o  maintain a force  of sh ips  i n  
Far  Eastern waters s u f f i c i e n t  t o  engage the  Japanese 
Navy. Any suggestion of help  from us t o  China provokes 
an  uproar i n  Japan . . . C ~ i t h  the) Effe t . . . t h a t  
we a r e  hindered from helping China . . . f 
The Chinese had, i n  the  l a t t e r  par t  of September 
1938, again  put the  quest ion of the Japanese invasion of 
China before t h e  Uague of Nations with the  hope t h a t  some 
s o r t  of a c t i o n  might be taken which would impair the  a b i l i t y  
of Japan t o  continue t o  press the war. Craigle,  with a view 
towards t h e  e f f e c t  on Japan which sanctions by tho League 
might have, s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
There is a g r e a t  dea l  t o  be sa id  f o r  app l ica t ion  
aga ins t  Japan of r e a l l y  e f f ec t ive  sanctions i n  f u l l  
co-operation with members of the  Councll. There 
seems nothing t o  be sa id  f o r  a purely t h e o r e t i c a l  or  
l a rge ly  Ine f f ec tua l  appl ica t ion,  e f f e c t s  of which 
would be b e t t e r  calculated t o  render i r r e s i s t i b l e  
present  t rend  towards a strengthening of Japanese 
t i e s  wlth T o t a l i t a r i a n  Sta tes .  Fnrthennore opportu- 
n i t y  would be seized by our enemies here t o  use t h i s  
as an  argument f o r  d isrupt ing our r i g h t s  i n  China 
even more completely then they are a t   resent.^ 
Halifax,  recognizing t h a t  some form of a i d  t o  China 
o r  pressure  upon Japan should be appl ied ,  on August 29 sug- 
ges ted t h a t  i n  t he  absence of se r ious  developments i n  Europe 
perhaps progressive a c t i o n  could be applied i n  the  following 
s t ages  ; 
( 1) i n s t i t u t i o n  i n  Bri t ish-control led t e r r i t o r i e s  
of various pe t ty  adminis t ra t ive  vexations on Japanese 
model; ( 2 )  such economic r e p r i s a l s  as may be possible 
without denouncing t r e a t y ,  again modelled s o  f a r  a s  
poss ible  on something the  Japanese have done; (3 )  the  
denunciation of Anglo-Japanese Trea ty  i n  respect  of 
c e r t a i n  colonies ;  ( 4 )  denunciation of the  t r e a t y  - In  
toto.2 
-
Craigie disagreed with t h i s  l i n e  of thought s t a t i ng  on 
October 23 t h a t ,  
. . . t he re  would be no advantage I n  gradual  execu- 
t i o n  of a policy of r e p r i s a l s  working up from pe t ty  
annoyances t o  denunciation, but t h a t  It should first 
be decided whether we a r e  prepared t o  accept a l l  con- 
sequences of denunciation and i f  we are so  prepared, 
we should denounce In  t o t o  a f t e r  f a i r  warning t o  Japan. 
This course has t h e m e z o f  being j u s t i f i a b l e  on t h e  
p r inc ip l e  t h a t  we cannot continue most-favored nat ion 
treatment t o  a country which does not  f u l f i l l  i t s  
t r e a t y  obl igat ions  (1.e. Nine-Power T r e a t y )  and . . . 
f a l l s  i n t o  l i n e  with recent  United S t a t e s  note 
C~ctober  63 . . . 3 
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He f u r t h e r  contended t h a t ,  
. Jo in t  or  p a r a l l e l  [economic retaliated 
a c t i o n  [with t he  United States] - or t he  t h r e a t  of 
such a c t i o n  - represents  the  only c e r t a i n  way open 
t o  us of ensuring not only respect  For ex i s t ing  
fore ign  r i g h t s  and i n t e r e s t s  i n  China, but a l s o  t h e  
maintenance of t h e  lopen doort  f o r  t he  fu ture .  l 
Pursuing t h i s  l i n e  f u r t h e r  he s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
I f  the  Dominions - or some of them - were t o  take  
corresponding a c t i o n  [denunciation], the  economic 
e f f e c t s  would be r o  t an to  g rea t e r ,  while p a r a l l e l  
a c t i o n  by the  Unite % States would render t he  e f f e c t  
of these  measures on Japan's economic s t r u c t u r e  well- 
nigh werwhe lming .2 
A s  regards p o l i t i c a l  r i s k s  these  would admittedly 
be g r e a t  i n  t h e  event of a c t i o n  by Great Br i t a in  alone 
but neg l ig ib le  i n  t he  event of p a r a l l e l  a c t i on  by 
B r i t i s h  Empire and United S t a t e s  of ~mer l ca .3  
But s ince  he f e l t  it would be unwise t o  count on any 
r e s o l u t e  a c t i o n  from the  United S t a t e s ,  
. . . the  next best  policy is t o  continue t h e  
present  method of playing f o r  time, protes t ing 
aga ins t  infringements of our r i g h t s ,  withholding 
c r e d i t s  and hoping t h a t  a continued res i s tance  by 
General Chiang Kai-shek . . . m y  induce a more 
reasonable frame of mind among the  Japanese 
Forewer ,  he f e l t  t h a t ,  
. . . i n  t h e i r  present mood . . . Cthe Japanesg  
might even r i s k  becoming embroiled w i t h  us i f  we were 
t o  take a s t e p  which would i n  e f f e c t  be indist inguish-  
ab l e  from sanct ions  . . . But I doubt i f  we r e a l l y  
need r u n  t h i s  r i s k .  Denunciation cannot come i n t o  
fo rce  f o r  a year  . . . bhus] no p r a c t i c a l  r e  u l t s  . 
. . can be expected before beginning of 1940. 7 
This f a c t  coupled w l t h  the recent  Japanese expedit ion i n t o  
South China caused the  Japanese t o  have, I n  Cra ig l e t s  estima- 
t i o n ,  
. . . extended t h e i r  commitments s o  g r e a t l y  t h a t  it 
l a  d i f f  i c u l t  not t o  deduce that t h e i r  resources mnst 
now have diminished a t  such a pace that no e f f o r t  on 
our p a r t  is needed . . . t o  )fasten the end [of the  
confl ict)  before . . . 1940. 
Thus although Craigie d id  not favor denunciation at the  
present  time he d i d  s t r e s s  that, r r .  . . I do not thfnk we 
need forbear  t o  l e t  the Japanese know t h a t  we have t h i s  
weapon i n  our armoury . . . I t  2 
Kerr, f r e s h  from a reoent meeting wlth Chiang hi- 
shek, summed up h i s  views concerning B r i t i s h  policy on 
November 7 when he s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
I th ink  t h a t  he CChiang Kai-shek] w a s  r i g h t  when he 
s a i d  t h a t  we were at  a p a r t i n g  of the  ways. I submit 
t h e  time has come t o  decide once and f o r  a l l  whether 
we a r e  going t o  do something f o r  t he  Chinese which 
w i l l  be of immediate p r a c t i c a l  use t o  them or  t o  
r e t r e a t  from engagements entered i n t o  a t  Geneva and 
p in  our f a i t h  on the  assurances of Japan. For myself 
I regard these  assurances a s  worthless while I consider 
t he  keeping of the  goodwill of the  Chinese, even per- 
haps a t  the p r ice  of some temporary f i nanc i a l  l o s s ,  t o  
be something of r e a l  and l a s t i n g  value of e s s e n t i a l  
importance t o  our whole pos i t ion  i n  t h i s  country i n  
f u t u r e  . . .. The first s t e p  towards t h i s  might be 
denunciation of Anglo- Japanese commercial t r e a t y .  3 
Halifax apparently agreed t h a t  the  time had come t o  
h e l p  China i n  a mate r ia l  manner, as indicated by h i s  s t a t e -  
ment of mid-December i n  which he s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
I f e e l  t h a t  t he  bes t  way i n  which we can show our 
sympathy with China and our confidence In  her  f u t u r e  
is t o  he lp  her  with such sohemes as export c r e d i t s  
e t c .  Concrete a s s i s t ance  of t h i s  kind w i l l  have a 
g r e a t e r  e f f e c t  than  any number of pious s tatements  
which a r e  f p t  t o  r a i s e  f a l s e  hopes with subsequent 
reac t ions .  
Cra ig ie ' s  turnabout i n  a t t i t u d e  toward t h e  Japanese 
Government as regards  its s i n c e r i t y ,  coupled with h i s  aware- 
ness  of t h e  growing Anglo-American co l l abora t ion  and 
i n t e r e s t  I n  methods of r e t a l i a t i o n ,  prompted him t o  r epo r t  
on January 1, 1939 t h a t :  
If . . . t h e r e  were t o  be imposed even a r e l a t i v e l y  
small r e s t r i c t i o n  on Japan's exports  of merchandise 
o r  gold and i f  c r e d i t s  and loans were simultaneously 
t o  be withheld Japan's economic s i t u a t i o n  would 
immediately become c r i t i c a l .  If a n  embargo were t o  be 
placed on Japan's  expor ts  t o  t h e  3 r i t i s h  Empire, 
United States and France ( t hus  a f f e c t i n g  70 per cent 
of he r  t o t a l  f o r e ign  exchange producing t r a d e ) ,  t h e  
e f f e c t  would . . . rap id ly  p r w e  d i s a s t rous  t o  Japan's 
economy. Such devices as Japan might r e s o r t  t o  i n  
co-operation w i t h  her  t o t a l i t a r i a n  a s soc i a t e s  would 
be q u i t e  inadequate t o  stem t h e  a b w e  process. Even 
a drop i n  value of currency would not  e x t r i c a t e  Japan 
from her  d i f f  i c ~ l t i e s . ~  
He then  recommended t h a t :  
The s imples t  and most e f f e c t i v e  f i r s t  s t e p  would appear 
t o  be f o r  Great Br i t a in ,  United S t a t e s  and France t o  
re fuse  t o  purchase any f u r t h e r  gold from Japan (assuming 
arrangements could be made t o  wevent  Japanese gold 
reaching those countr ies  through t h i r d  p a r t i e s ) . 3  
By mid-December and e a r l y  January Anglo-American 
co l l abo ra t i on  w a s  increas ing rap id ly  i n  con t ras t  t o  what I t  
had been before. The Br i t i sh  of course were des i rous  of 
channelling t h i s  new found Amerioan a t t i t u d e  which mlght 
poss ibly  l ead  t o  a c t i v e  cooperation i n t o  paths which r an  
p a r a l l e l  t o  those of t h e i r  own bes t  i n t e r e s t s .  They a l s o  
were at pains t o  do nothing t o  d i v e r t  t h i s  new American 
a t t i t u d e  from its course. Heretofore Craigie had f e l t  t h a t  
jo in t  Anglo-American act ion,  whether t o  a i d  China o r  f o r  t h e  
purpose of r e t a l i a t i o n  agains t  Japan was a comparatively 
s a f e  course t o  embark upon as regards Japanese counter- 
ac t i ons ,  only as long as it were p a r a l l e l  o r  joint .  
It was then h i s  lack of f a i t h  i n  both t he  resolute-  
ness of American a c t i o n  and the  s i n c e r i t y  of the  Japanese 
Government combined with h i s  be l ie f  t h a t  the  Japanese 
economic s t ruc tu re  had been s o  weakened t h a t  she would soon 
have t o  bring t h e  c o n f l i c t  t o  a conclusion which prompted 
him t o  e a r l i e r  recommend t h a t  Br i t a in  avoid embarking upon a 
course of r e t a l i a t i o n .  Indeed, he had urged t h a t  Br i t a in  
continue t o  pursue her  present policy, t h a t  of protes t ing 
Japanese infringements of B r i t i s h  r i g h t s  coupled with not 
mate r ia l ly  a id ing China. 
On January 1 of 1939 he reported t h a t ,  
. . . I f  p a r a l l e l  measures a r e  t o  be applied by 
B r i t i s h  Empire and Vnited S t a t e s  i n  support of 
Chinese Government and/or f o r  economic pressure on 
Japan I f e e l  (a) present moment is the  most favorable 
. . . and ( b )  t h a t  from now onwards c e r t a i n  f ac to r s  
might operate i n  Japan's favor. My reasons a r e :  - 
1. Japanese army is so deeply committed over a vas t  
a r e a  i n  China. 2 .  Prospect of fu ture  economic and 
f i n a n c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  Is beginning t o  have i t s  e f f e c t  
i n  competent Japanese c i r c l e s .  3. Lhited S t a t e s  a t t i -  
tude f o r  t he  first time shows d e f i n i t e  s igns of harden- 
ing. 4. Ser ies  of oapanese] dec la ra t ions  s ince  
November 3 have . . . t i f f  o rdea  concrete j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  counter a c t i o n  and . . . @iminished> such hopes as 
were formerly enter ta ined of change i n  Japanese policy 
through advent t o  power of moderate elements . . . . 5. 
. . . (Poss ib le  d i s in t eg ra t ion  i n  China . . . might be 
a r r e s t e d  by some s ign  of more reso lu te  a c t i o n  by Great 
B r i t a i n  and United S ta tes .  6. Japan's f a i l u r e  t o  reach 
usual  f i sh ing  modus vivendi with U.S.S.B. may a t  any 
moment develop i n t o  f i r s t  c l a s s  c r i s i s  and economic 
a c t i o n  i f  it is t o  be taken should synchronize with 
 uss so-~apanese tension.1 
Craigie a f t e r  showing how vulnerable t o  economic 
r e t a l i a t o r y  a c t i o n  he believed Japan ac tua l ly  w a s ,  w a s  now 
anxious t o  obta in  t h e  f u l l  cooperation of t h e  Whited Sta tes .  
He suggested t h a t  when considering the  a l t e rna t ive  t o  such a 
course it be pointed out t h a t ,  
. . . it is no longer a quest ion merely of protect- 
ing t h i s  o r  t h a t  vested or  t rade  i n t e r e s t  i n  China but 
of preventing, while there  is ye t  time, the  formation 
i n  E a s t  A s i a  of a va l id  and economic e n t i t y  which may 
have se r ious  repercussions on c r e d i t  of every category 
of Power. Ambitions of elements which today a r e  
dominant I n  Japan w i l l  be l imited by the  degree of 
r e s i s t ance  which they encounter - and by nothing e l se .  
Kerr had been thinking along somewhat the  same l i n e s  
when he s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
It seems t o  me i f  we a r e  decided t h a t  our pos i t ion  
i n  China is t o  be saved, w e  must apprecia te  t h a t  t h i s  
can only be achieved by our own e f f o r t s  and not by the  
indulgence of Japanese, t h a t  we should from now on 
approach problem with determination t h a t  sooner or  
l a t e r  the re  I s  t o  be a day of reckoning and t h a t  our 
plans should l a i d  agains t  t h a t  day.3 
l ~ b i d . ,  - p. 362. 2 ~ b i d . .  - pp. 362-363. 
3 ~ b i d . ,  - p. 251. 
He concluded by s t a t i n g  t h a t ,  
I should l i k e  t o  see ourselves,  t he  Americans and 
t h e  R e n c h  make a common dec l a r a t i on  of pol icy  i n  t h e  
Far  E a s t .  A t  t h e  same time, keeping pace with any 
r e p r i s a l s  we may be ab le  t o  take aga in s t  Japan, t he  
Americans might be prompted t o  make some extension of 
t h e i r  sys temat ica l  warnings (now, I understand, con- 
f i ned  t o  a i r c r a f t )  i n  respect  of cammodities e s s e n t i a l  
t o  t h e  ~ a p a n e s e  .l
I n  a statement  of e a r l y  January 1939 Halifax r e f l e c t e d  
some views s t a t e d  e a r l i e r  by Craigie ,  i f  not more op t imis t i -  
c a l l y ,  when he s a i d  t h a t ,  
. . . we $is Majestyls ~overnmena  t h ink  t h a t  the 
time has come when a c t i o n  of t h i s  kind burrency 
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  l o a a  might have the  maximum e f f e c t  
wi th  t he  minimum r i s k .  Already t he  tone of the  Uhited 
S t a t e s  note cof December 30, 19383 and our dec i s ions  
t o  g ive  (export] c r e d i t s  have produced a s a l u t a r y  
e f f e c t  on Japanese who have shown s igns  recen t ly  of 
being more accommodating. But e f f e c t  produced by 
p a r a l l e l  a c t i o n  of t h e  two Governments [United S t a t e s  
and ~ r i ta i3  on l i n e s  of simultaneous contr ibut ions  
t o  currency s t a b i l i z a t i o n  fund might i n  our view be 
expected t o  be much grea te r .  Moreover the  confidence 
of t he  Chinese i n  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  hold out and t h e i r  
morale genera l ly  would be enormously strengthened by 
such a ges tu r e  which might Indeed p r w e  the  turning 
point  i n  t h e  whole s t rugg le  and lead t o  t he  s a l v a t i o n  
of United S t a t e s  and B r i t i s h  commercial i n t e r e s t s .  
Furthermore, t he  psychological e f f e c t  of t h i s  move 
might we l l  show i t s e l f  i n  an  inoreased r e s i l i e n c y  
of t h e  Chinese d o l l a r  thus reducing r i s k  of contribu- 
t i o n s  t o  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  fund being l o s t e 2  
Cralg ie ,  although not as op t iml s t l c  as Halifax, d id  
support  h i s  view t h a t  the  Japanese r eac t i on  t o  the proposed 
currency s t a b i l i z a t i o n  fund would be mild when he s t a t e d  
t h a t ,  
be l i e f  t h a t  no Japanese counter-action more 
s e r ious  than f u r t h e r  pressure on our i n t e r e s t s  i n  
China 1s t o  be an t ic ipa ted  is  strengthened by rela- 
t i v e l y  mild r eac t ion  t o  American and Br i t i sh  notes 
and recen t  American c r ed i t  t o  China . . . . . Informed 
s e c t i o n  of Japanese opinion (e.g. banks1 opinion) 
would s t i l l  welcome support of China's currency but 
more important considerat ion is t h a t  even i n  m i l i t a r y  
and c i v i l  o f f i c i a l  c i r c l e s  both i n  Tokyo and Shanghai 
there  appears t o  be a growing r e a l i z a t i o n  tha t  support 
of currency is a Japanese i n t e r e s t  . . . I a m  however 
doubt fu l  whether such people as 'extreme supporters  of 
Federal  reserve  Bank scheme', would take s o  far-sighted 
a view and whatever may be l o g i c a l  and technica l  reasons 
i n  favour of proposed s teps ,  the  rescue of Chinese 
d o l l a r  by B r i t i s h  ac t ion  , . . must nec s s a r i l y  be 
highly d i s t a s t e f u l  t o  Japanese opinion. ? 
However even though Craigie did expect only a re la -  
t i v e l y  mild r eac t ion  from the Japanese he d id  request  t h a t ,  
". . . I . . . be given arguments t o  show t h a t  c rea t ion  of 
proposed fund could not be used even Ind i r ec t ly  t o  promote 
purchase of munitions . n2 Kerr disagreed, s t a t i n g  t h a t  he 
d id  not, I t .  . . t h ink  t h a t  i n  t he  long run the re  is anything 
t o  be gained by tempering the  blow burrency s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
loaft) t o  Japan as suggested by S i r  R. Craigie . . . n 3 
Halifax,  bel ieving t h a t  the United S t a t e s  Government 
w a s  prepared t o  take  p a r a l l e l  and simultaneous ac t ion  w i t h  
t he  B r i t i s h  on the  proposed currency loan, s t a t e d  on 
January 6 t h a t ,  
The e s s e n t i a l  points  . . . a r e  t h a t  it should be 
made c l e a r  Lto t h e  ~apanes6) that ac t ion  i s  being 
I Ibld., p. 400. 
-
taken by both Governments [United S t a t e s  and ~ r l t a i a  
t o  maintain our respective i n t e r e s t s  i n  China which 
would be se r ious ly  t h r  atened by a collapse of t h e  
Chinese currency . . . !I 
However upon learning t h a t  the United S t a t e s  Gwernment w a s  
not prepared t o  join the  Br i t i sh  Gwernment i n  t h e  proposed 
currency loan, he w a s  forced t o  modify h i s  previous ins t ruc-  
t i o n s  with regard t o  how it was t o  be presented t o  the  
Japanese. He obviously could not now s t r e s s  t he  f a c t  t h a t  
it was the  product of joint  Anglo-American ac t ion ,  but he 
d id  retain, Indeed he increased, the  weight given t o  the 
argument t h a t  i t  w a s  not done t o  a i d  a n  enemy of Japan, but 
only t o  maintain t h e  Br i t i sh  i n t e r e s t s  I n  China. H i s  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o  Craigie s t a t ed :  
. . . I th ink  your main l i n e  must be tha t  s t a b i l i t y  
of d o l l a r  is a B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t ,  t h a t  our in tervent ion 
i n  support of it has been rendered necessary by 
Japanese a c t i o n  and, i f  a per fec t ly  legi t imate  s t e p  
taken by H i s  Majesty's Government i n  defence of Br i t i sh  
i n t e r e s t s  has i n d i r e c t  r e s u l t  of helping Japan's 
opponents, Japan has only herse l f  t o  blame f o r  pu t i n g  
us i n  t he  pos i t i on  of having t o  take t h i s  ac t ion.  8 
A s  regards r e t a l i a t i o n  Halifax s t a t e d  t h a t  H i s  
Majesty's Government was of the opinion t h a t  any form of 
economic r e t a l i a t i o n  would not be immediately e f f ec t ive  thus 
allowing Japan time t o  readjus t  her  economy as regards 
markets, e tc .  He concluded by s t a t i n g  on January 23 t h a t ,  
. . . A policy of r e t a l i a t i o n  cannot be embarked 
upon without a c l e a r  r e a l i z a t i o n  t o  what it  w i l l  lead 
if Pursued t o  the  end - and the  object ions t o  embark- 
ing on such a ~ o l i c y  and then being forced t o  r e t r a c t  
a r e  self-evident .  Whatever may be the  i n i t i a l  s t e p  
i n  a pollcy of r e t a l i a t i o n ,  the  r e a l  problem Is the  
p o l i t i c a l  dilema tha t  non-re ta l ia t ion may involve 
t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  protect  the Treaty r i g h t s  and leg i t imate  
I n t e r e s t s  of B r i t i s h  and Amerlcan nat ionals  aga ins t  
d i sc r imina t ion  and the  danger of eventual e l iminat ion 
by Japanese aggression; while r e t a l i a t i o n  involves 
t h e  danger of counter-measures and of w a r  . . . . 
H i s  Majesty's Government have h i t h e r t o  been disposed 
t o  t h ink  t h a t ,  i n  the  present s t a t e  of Europe, the  
r i g h t  policy f o r  the  present is  not t o  embark on 
r e t a l i a t  ion. 1 
Craigie on January 28 took issue  with Halifax s t a t i n g  
t h a t  i n  h i s  view p a r a l l e l  Anglo-American economic r e t a l i a -  
t i o n  would, as he had e a r l i e r  pointed out,  be immediately 
e f f e c t i v e .  Moreover, he continued, 
. . . I f e e l  the  main issue  is now far wider and 
far  more important s ince  what is  a t  s take  is not 
only our commercial investment i n  China but the  
whole p o l i t i c a l  and economic fu ture  of countr ies  
with i n t e r e s t s  i n  the Pac i f ic  t o  say  nothing of the  
urgency of ensuring the  observance of t r e a t y  obliga- 
t i o n s  as a matter  of! pr inciple .  I f  what we are 
s t r i v i n g  f o r  is t o  uphold a pr inc ip le  and ave r t  a 
fu tu re  danger we a r e  j u s t i f i ed  i n  taking g rea t e r  
r i s k s  i n  terms of short-run disadvantage than i f  
our a i m  were merely t o  preserve ex i s t ing  i n t e r e s t s  
i n t a c t  . . . r i s k  of w a r  is s l i g h t  i f  the  a a t t e r  is 
properly handled. 
The quest ion of whether China were t o  be aided or  
whether s t eps  of r e t a l i a t i o n  should be taken agains t  Japan 
was ul t imate ly  decided by which course offered the l e a s t  
r i s k  of war. The s t i f f e n i n g  of American a t t i t u d e  coupled 
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with the increasing W e a b s s  of the Japanese economg. made 
r e t a l i a t i on  seem more a t t r a c t i v e  than it otherwise would 
have In addi t ion,  the  various Japanese public  declara-  
t i o n s  of fu tu re  i n t e n t  which s o  c l ea r ly  showed t h a t  i f  she 
Were a b l e  t o  Press these plans t o  a successful  conclusion, 
fo re ign  i n t e r e s t s  I n  China would be destroyed, w a s  ye t  
another  p r d  toward the  implementation of a policy of 
r e t a l i a t  ion. 
However, I f  a choice were t o  be made a course of 
a c t i o n  which were t o  a i d  China, especia l ly  i f  it could be 
cloaked i n  some s o r t  of camouflage as t o  i ts  t r u e  In t en t ,  
w a s  c e r t a i n  t o  be t he  l e a s t  d i s t a s t e f u l  t o  Japan with, con- 
sequently,  t h e  l e a s t  r i s k  of war. 
Both courses of ac t ion  were, i n  the  end, intended t o  
accomplish e s s e n t i a l l y  the same goals:  t h a t  being the  
l imi t i ng  of the  a b i l i t y  of Japan t o  press forward w i t h  her  
plans f o r  E a s t  A s i a .  Aid t o  China, i f  a b i t  more round 
about than r e t a l i a t i o n ,  would i n  the  end accomplish the  same 
thing. If China could be strengthened by Br i t i sh  ass i s tance  
it w a s  hoped t h a t  she would be able  t o  continue the  s t ruggle  
with Japan u n t i l  the  l a t t e r  had so  exhausted her economic 
s t r e m t h  t h a t  she would be forced t o  terminate the  conf l i c t .  
China a t  t he  same t i n e  then would not f ind  it necessary t o  
pursue any a l t e r n a t i v e  courses of ac t ion ,  which would have 
been highly d i s t a s t e f u l  t o  the B r i t i s h ,  such a s  t h e  estab- 
lishment of c loser  t i e s  w i t h  Russia or  even a j o i n l m  of 
f o r c e s  wi th  Japan. Thus e i t h e r  course,  aid t o  China o r  
r e t a l i a t i o n ,  would accomplish essentially the same thlnq. 
The B r i t i s h  took t h e  course of l e a s t  r e s i s t ance  which was 
aid t o  China. 
CHAPTER I11 
BRITISH ACTIONS VERSUS UNITZD STATES ACTIONS : 
WHO WAS LEADING? 
Great  B r i t a in ,  from August 1938 t o  March of 1939, 
could be character ized  as courting the  United S t a t e s  with a 
view towards channeling her  ac t ions  i n  ways favorable t o  t he  
execut ion  of B r i t i s h  fo re ign  policy. This was, however, 
done ever  s o  sub t l y  s o  as not  t o  f u r t h e r  arouse the  i so la -  
t ionism prevalent  wi th in  the  United S t a t e s  a t  t h i s  time. 
Great ca re  was taken t o  avoid a l l  appearances t h a t  B r i t a i n  
w a s  aga in  i n  t roub le  and looking t o  the  United S t a t e s  t o  
b a l l  he r  out. Thus t h e  technique most o f ten  used w a s  t h a t  
of appearing t o  be tending t o  its own business,  being recep- 
t i v e  t o  a l l  United S t a t e s  suggestions,  ye t  t o  not appear t o  
be pushing. The d e s i r e  t o  avoid the  appearance of pushing, 
r e s u l t e d  i n  most of t h e  a c t u a l  overtures  f o r  jo in t  -10- 
American ac t i ons  being made by t he  United S t a t e s .  However, 
once made, B r i t a i n  l o s t  no time i n  d isplaying its d e s i r e  t o  
cooperate.  Most of a l l  B r i t a in  des i red  t h a t  t h i s  coopera- 
t i o n  t ake  the  form of p a r a l l e l  a c t i ons ,  which the  B r i t i s h  
f e l t  were l e s s  dangerous s ince  Japan would thus be presented 
with more formidable opposition. 
B r i t a in ,  of course,  was occupied i n  both Europe and 
t h e  Mediterranean and was consequently weakened In the Far 
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Eastern  area.  The United S ta tes ,  it was f e l t ,  would help  i n  
overcoming t h i s  weakness should Br i t a in  be a b l e  t o  secure 
p a r a l l e l  Anglo-American ac t ions  i n  the p o l i t i c s  of t h e  Far 
East.  
The United S t a t e s ,  with i ts  d i s t a s t e  f o r  becoming 
involved i n  the  a f f a i r s  of other  peoples, based its p ro t e s t s  
t o  Japan on purely l e g a l i s t i c  principles.  Their p ro t e s t s  
were based on the  'Open Door', the  Kellog Pact and upon the  
Washington Trea t ies ,  spec i f i ca l l y  the Nine-Power Treaty. 
Br i t a in ,  on t h e  other  hand, while ce r t a in ly  not  omitting 
reference t o  t he  various l e g a l  arguments d id  sit  down with 
t h e  Japanese and attempt t o  hammer out so lu t ions  acceptable 
t o  both s i d e s ,  which d id  i n  a sense take i n t o  account the  
r e a l i t i e s  of t he  time, t h a t  is,  w a r  with China. 
The United S t a t e s  made pro tes t s  t o  t he  Japanese a t  
infrequent  In t e rva l s ;  the  p ro t e s t s  when they came covered a 
v a r i e t y  of grievances. Br i ta in  began the period i n  quest ion 
by submitting p ro t e s t s  when each grievance occurred. But by 
October o r  November the  Br i t i sh  came t o  f e e l ,  as d id  the  
United S t a t e s ,  t h a t  i t  was best  t o  s t o r e  up grievances and 
submit them from time t o  time thereby avoiding the  p i t f a l l  
of becoming regarded as a constant i r r i t a n t .  
The United S t a t e s  Note t o  Japan of October 6 ,  1938 
seemed t o  be the  turning point a s  regards Anglo-American 
cooperation. Previous t o  t h i s  the United S t a t e s  had shown 
34 
l i t t l e  i n ~ l i n a t i ~ n  t o  act jo in t ly  with Br i t a in  i n  t h i s  area. 
With t he  Japanese r e j ec t ion  of t h e i r  Note the United S t a t e s  
l o s t  l i t t l e  time i n  approaching Br i ta in  I n  regard t o  what 
s o r t  of conclusions they had drawn and what s o r t  of ac t ions  
it would be most advisable t o  take,  etc .  
During August and September Craigie w a s  involved i n  a 
s e r i e s  of Interviews with the  top personnel i n  t he  Japanese 
fo re ign  o f f i c e  attempting t o  solve or  a t  l e a s t  lessen some 
of the  problems and disputes  which were occurring between 
the  B r i t i s h  and Japanese au tho r i t i e s  I n  China. These t a l k s  
extended, off  and on, i n t o  October with the Br i t i sh ,  on the  
one hand, at tempting t o  work with the Japanese i n  f inding 
amicable so lu t ions ,  and on the  other hand being q u i t e  care- 
f u l  l e s t  they inadvertently arouse the  snspicions of the  
United S t a t e s  Government, or f o r  t h a t  matter,  i t s  press or  
populace, t h a t  Br i t a in  was ready t o  s e l l  out t o  Japan. This 
very r e a l  f e a r  was voiced from time t o  time even i n t o  1939. 
Halifax voiced it saying, 
. . . I regard the word 'co-operate' as having most 
dangerous implications. I f  the  Japanese were l a t e r  t o  
say publ ic ly ,  as they cer ta in ly  would, t h a t  we had 
promised t o  'co-operatef ,  we should be exposed t o  
every s o r t  of suspicion and inevitably be at tacked In  
Parllament and i n  the  press,  not tf mention e f f e c t  i n  
t he  United S t a t e s  of America . . . 
Craigie echoed the pangs of anxiety voiced by Halifax 
saying t h a t :  
J. Ib id . ,  
7
While u l t imate  understanding with Japan is what we 
a r e  aiming a t ,  t h e  l i n e  taken . . . is a l i t t l e  
dangerous at a moment when American a t t i t u d e  toward 
Japan appears  t o  be hardening [refers t o  United S t a t e s  
Note of October 6 3  . . . ~y United S t a t e s  colleague 
asked me yesterday r a t h e r  pointedly whether t he r e  w a s  
any t r u t h  i n  these  repor t s  of a new trend i n  London, 
and I r e p l i e d  i n  t he  negative . . . It would be wel l  
t o  keep United S t a t e s  Embassy promptly informed of 
any new conversations between B r l  i s h  o f f i c i a l s  and 
t h e  new Japanese Ambassador . . . $ 
In s t ruc t i ons  were accordingly issued t o  Craigie  t o  
d i s p e l  any doubts which the  United S t a t e s  harboured concern- 
ing B r i t i s h  pol icy  as indica ted  I n  the  preceeding paragraph. 
He w a s  t o  t e l l  . . . M r .  Grew b i t e d  S t a t e s  Ambassador t o  
~ a p a 3  and Uhited S t a t e s  Gwernment bhat ia can r e s t  
a ssured  that H I S  Majesty's Government have no i n t en t i on  of 
al lowing themselves t o  be inveigled i n t o  negot ia t ions  f o r  a 
deal w i t h  Japan in imica l  t o  the r i g h t s  o r  i n t e r e s t s  of China 
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o r  any o ther  t h i r d  party.  
Halifax displayed t h i s  same f e a r  again,  but i n  a 
somewhat d i f f e r e n t  sense,  when he s a id  t h a t  r a t h e r  than  l o se  
c o n t r o l  of t h e  Shanghai In te rna t iona l  Set t lement ' s  Municipal 
Administrat ion through ' f u l l  co-operation1 with the  
Japanese, it would be : 
. . . b e t t e r  t h a t  they should take  it i l l e g a l l y  by 
fo r ce  majeure than t h a t  we should surrender  the  posi- 
t i o n  vo lun t a r i l y .  In t h e  former case we should a t  
l e a s t  have t he  moral support of t he  Americans . . . 3 
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The B r i t i s h  were a t  g r ea t  pains not t o  unduly annoy 
t h e  United S t a t e s  by ac t ion  they might take. Hence, even 
though t h e r e  w a s  a t  t h i s  s tage  no Anglo-American co-opera- 
t i o n  I n  t h e  sense t o  which it was l a t e r  t o  develop, the  
B r i t i s h  nonetheless were ca re fu l  t o  sound out the views of 
t h e  United S ta tes .  Ins t ruct ions  which Kerr received, during 
t h e  course of negot ia t ions  with the  Japanese on r e t u r n  of 
t h e  Northern D i s t r i c t  of Shuaghai t o  the  Settlement, t o :  
. . . dlscnss  t he  quest ion conf ident ia l ly  with h i s  
United S t a t e s  colleague and the  Br i t i sh  and Ameriuan 
Council lors  with a view t o  seeing wh t h e r  any fu r the r  f concessions can be sa fe ly  made . . ., 
se rve  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s ,  
Although the  S t a t e  Department and the Foreign Office 
as l a t e  as mid-October had not ye t  embarked upon any form of 
cooperat ion or  col lus ion,  Craigie and Grew had regular ly  
exchanged views on a var ie ty  of subjects  and had, as Craigie 
put  I t ,  ". . . a complete system f o r  conf ident ia l  exchange 
of information and communications addressed t o  the Japanese 
2 Governmenton The Br i t i sh  Foreign Office, aware of t h i s  
Ambassadorial re la t ionsh ip ,  not infrequently sounded out the  
Representat ive of t h e  American Government i n  Tokyo as t o  h i s  
Government 1s views on various subJects ,  having; Cralgie put 
t h e  sub jec t  t o  Grew i n  such a way as t o  give the  appearance 
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of having emanated from the  former as a purely personal 
inquiry .  This Of course very n e a t 4  avoided giving the  
American Government the  fee l ing of being pushed and a l s o  of 
g iv ing  r i s e  i n  t he  American press o r  Congress t o  suspicions 
of Anglo-American collusion. 
The hesi tancy on the  par t  of the  United S t a t e s  t o  
a l i g n  i t s e l f  with any Br i t i sh  ac t ions  began, a f t e r  October 6, 
t o  slowly evolve i n t o ,  i f  not ac t ive  cooperation and jo int  
a c t i o n  with Br i ta in ,  a t  l e a s t  an o f f i c i a l  awareness t h a t  
both Governments faced a similar problem i n  t he  Far  E a s t  and 
an  a c t i v e  i n t e r e s t  i n  t he  s teps  which Br i t a in  had heretofore 
taken and proposed t o  take,  coupled with a s t i f f e n i n g  of her  
a t t i t u d e  toward t h e  ac t ions  of Japan i n  t he  area.  Br i t a in  
w a s ,  of course, q u i t e  in teres ted  i n  any form of cooperation 
and jo in t  measures t he  United S ta tes  might propose. She was 
encouraged by the  new a t t i t u d e  the United S t a t e s  had assumed 
both vis-a-vis Japan and closer  Anglo-American r e l a t  ion- 
s h i p s ,  but  doubted t h a t ,  even i f  the American Government d i d  
continue i t s  new tack,  which i n  i t s e l f  was open t o  some 
doubt ,  t h a t  the  American press,  public o r  Congress would 
al low it. 
Craigie on October 4. 1938 reported t h a t ,  
My United S t a t e s  co l lewue  informed me conf ident ia l ly  
t h a t  he yesterday received ins t ruc t ions  t o  present t o  
t h e  Japanese Government a lengthy note [United S ta tes  
Note of October 6 )  giving Instances of d iscr iminat ion 
a g a i n s t  American t rade  In  China, monopolistic tenden- 
c i e s ,  exchange i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  &c.l  
The immediate reac t ion  of Halifax t o  the note of 
October 6 w a s  t o  r e f e r  t o  the  bind i n  which the  Br i t i sh  
Government had been accordingly placed. He s t a t ed  t h a t  i f  
t h e  Japanese should : 
. . now accede t o  American demands and l a t e r  
dec l ine  t o  g ive  u s  similar treatment on the  ground 
t h a t  we have more openly and ac t ive ly  assisted the  
Chinese, we can hardly argue t h a t  the United S t a t e s  
of America have done more f o r  China than we by s i l v e r  
purchases, recent  wheat loan, s a l e s  of munitions & c., 
f o r  t h a t  would place us i n  an impossible pos i t ion  vis-  
a-vis  both our own public  and the  United S t a t e s  of 
America. If we say t o  the  Japanese now t h a t  we s h a l l  
expect similar treatment . . . there  is perhaps a 
danger t h a t  the Japanese may t e l l  the Americans t h a t  
al though they would l i k e  t o  meet them, they cannot do 
s o  because it would mean meeting us a l so ,  and the  
Americans would then  accuse us of having queered 
t h e i r  pltch.2 
Craigie accordingly assured Halifax t h a t ,  IfGenerally 
speaking my United S t a t e s  colleagues and I regard a l l  
demands we make of Japanese Government as complimentary and 
any favourable r e s u l t s  as mutually benef ic ia l .  " 3 
With an  eye t o  any possible benef i t s  which Br i t a in  
might r eap  as a r e s u l t  of the United S ta tes  note, Halifax 
In s t ruc t ed  Craigie,  as regards h i s  s e r i e s  of interviews with 
the  Minister  and Vice-Minister f o r  Foreign Affa i r s ,  t h a t  he 
. . . should defe r  coming t o  any decis ion . . . u n t i l  we 
1 Ib id . ,  p. 116. 
-
s e e  what is  l i k e l y  t o  be t he  outcome of the United S t a t e s  
1 d e l  marche . . Referring t o  these interviews he s t a t e d  
-
t h a t ,  
C lea r ly  w e  should not  show a readiness t o  be more 
accommodating than t he  Americans: we ought t o  be 
prepared t o  go  as f a r  as they i n  the  matter of 
Inducements t o  negot ia te  a set t lement  of our 
r e s p e c t i v e  de  y n d s  , but I doubt i f  we should go 
much f u r t h e r .  
Cra ig le ,  although hopeful that the  United S t a t e s  note 
portended a b r i g h t e r  f u tu r e  s t a t e d  on November 4 t h a t  i t :  
. . . has r a i s e d  hopes t h a t  we s h a l l  be ab l e  t o  
count upon t he  support of the  United S t a t e s  Govern- 
ment, i f  we a r e  u l t imate ly  provoked t o  take  some 
economic r e t a l i a t o r y  a c t i o n  . . . although opinion 
i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  appears t o  be slowly evolving, 
it would be unwise t o  count on any reso lu te  a c t i o n  
from t h a t  quar ter .3  
Referr ing  f u r t h e r  t o  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of United 
S t a t e s  suppor t  of any fu tu re  economic r e p r i s a l s ,  Craigle  
summarized h i s  genera l  f ee l ings  saying t h a t :  
I f e e l  it would be a mistake t o  count too  much on 
any such move by the  United S t a t e s  . . . It would be 
even more of a mistake f o r  us t o  make, uninvited,  any 
proposals  i n  t h i s  sense t o  t he  United S t a t e s  Govern- 
ment . . . f o r  t he  moment the  bes t  channel of 
communication i n  such a matter would be through my 
American col league and myself, thus  avoiding t he  
r e t o r t ,  which f i n d s  i t ' s  way a l l  too  e a s i l y  i n t o  
t h e  American p ress ,  t h a t  once aga in  Br i t a in  is 
i n v i t i n g  t h e  Uhit d S t a t e s  t o  I p u l l  the  chestnuts  
out  of t h e  f i r e 1 .  8 
Pursuing t h e  a b w e  l i n e  f u r t h e r ,  Cralgie s a i d  t h a t ,  
A t  a moment when I am s t i l l  hoping United S t a t e s  
Government w i l l  not run 'away from t h e i r  own note of 
October 6,  it might be bad t a c t i c s  t o  make communica- 
t i o n  b e f e r s  t o  a request from Halifax t h a t  he speak 
t o  Grew with  a view t o  obtaining United S ta tes  relaxa- 
t i o n  of t h e i r  s t r i c t l y  l e g a l i s t i c  view of the Nine- 
Power Trea ty-  which S ta te  Department could constme 
o r  a f  e c t  t o  construe as a weakening of Br i t i sh  a t t i -  
tude . I 
The United S t a t e s  note of October 6 had increased the  
B r i t i s h  d e s i r e  t o  reach some sort OF understanding with the 
former r e l a t i n g  t o  jo int  ac t i on  i n  the  Far Eas t .  Craigie on 
October 13 cabled t h a t  he had been turning over i n  h i s  mind: 
. . . whether it might not be advisable t o  convey 
t o  Japanese Government a h in t  of possible r e p r i s a l s  
C~apanese  be t r ea t ed  i n  United S t a t e s  as Americans 
t r e a t e d  i n  Japanese occupied a rea l  i n  much the same 
form as it was conveyed i n  United S ta tes  Government's 
note of October 6 . . . 2 
However, by November 10, Craigie,  a f t e r  having seen a 
r a t h e r  more f irm and posi t ive  policy was t o  be taken by the  
Japanese Government as occasioned by the  Japanese Govern- 
ment's statement of November 2 and the broadcast of Prince 
Konoye on November 3 which l e f t  no doubt as t o  Japanese 
plans  f o r  East Asia, had changed h i s  view. He now noted 
t h a t  B r i t a i n  was for tuna te  t h a t  the United S ta tes  note: 
. . . should have been communicated a t  t h i s  par t ic-  
u l a r  juncture and there is every advantage f o r  the  
present  In  leaving the lead t o  the United S t a t e s  
Government. I venture t o  suggest i f  a t  t h i s  juncture 
we avoid a l l  appearances of prodding the United S t a t e s  
I n t o  ac t ion ,  t h a t  country is  l i k e l y  t o  go both fu r the r  
and f a s t e r  and might soon i t s e l f  be proposing ' p a r e l l e l  
 bid., - p. 269. 
2 Ibid. ,  p. 136. 
-
a c t i o n f  by the  French and ourselves. 1 
S i r  A. Clark Kerr taking note of the  United S ta tes  
I demarche of October 6 ,  and the  Japaneae declara t ions  of 
po l icy  of November 2 and 3 took a d i f f e r en t  view saying. 
I should l i k e  t o  see ourselves, t he  Americans and 
t h e  French make a common declara t ion of policy i n  the  
Far East. A t  t h e  same time, keeping pace with any 
r e p r i s a l s  we may be able  t o  take  agains t  Japan, the 
Americans might be prompted as a beginning t o  make 
some extension of t h e i r  systematical  warnings (now, 
I understand, conf ined t o  a i r c r a f t )  i n  respect  of 
commodities e s s e n t i a l  t o  the  Japanese, 2 
By ea r ly  November the  Unlted S ta tes  w a s  becoming more 
a c t i v e  i n  seeking Anglo-American cooperation. Halifax on 
November 5 inf  ormed Craigie t h a t  he had been t o l d  by the  
United S t a t e s  Embassy t h a t  Grew had been Ins t ructed t o  mke  
a s t rong  represen ta t ion  concerning freedom of navigation on 
t h e  Yangtze and t h a t  the :  
. . . United S ta tes  Ambassador i n  Tokyo has  been 
in s t ruc t ed  t o  suspend ac t ion  f o r  a  few days agains t  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  we and French Government would 
wish t o  make similar but separate representa t ions  i n  
TOUO. 3 
C r a i g i e t s  r eac t ion  was t h a t ,  
My French colleague and I consider i t  important 
not t o  push United S ta tes  Government fu r the r  than 
they wish t o  go and I have therefore informed my 
United S t a t e s  colleague tha t  f o r  our par t  we conc 
i n  procedure favored by IJnited S t a t e s  Government. t" 
During the course of a  conversation with Grew In  the 
f i r s t  week of November, Cralgle had inquired a s  t o  whether 
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t h e  s u b j e c t  of r e p r i s a l s  had received any cons idera t ion  by 
t h e  United S t a t e s  Government. Upon rece iv ing  a r e p l y  i n  the  
a f f i r m a t i v e  he t h e r e  upon proceeded t o  o u t l i n e  h i s  a n a l y s i s  
t h a t  i n  h i s  view denunciat ion of t h e  Anglo-Japanese 
Commerclal Trea ty  would be t h e  bes t  course of a c t i o n ,  adding 
t h a t  i f  any such a c t i o n  were taken any r i s k s  a t t endan t  
t h e r e o n  would be enormously reduced i f  t h e  United S t a t e s  
were t o  t a k e  p a r a l l e l  ac t ion .  Af ter  subsequently in t imat ing  
t h a t  t h e  aforementioned might be passed t o  t h e  S t a t e  Depart- 
ment, he poin ted  out t h a t :  
There w a s  a n a t u r a l  re luc tance  on our p a r t  t o  t ake  
t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  such a matter i n  Washington, but ,  
i f  United S t a t e s  Government were a l ready considering 
t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  it was important t h a t  they should a t  
l e a s t  know t h a t  i t  w a s  a l s o  under cons idera t ion  i n  
London. 1 
Both Governments had been studying the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
r e p r i s a l s  a l though no communcations concerning any con- 
c l u s i o n s  they  might have reached had been exchanged up t o  
t h i s  time. B r i t a i n ,  as Craigie  had pointed out ,  w a s  
r e l u c t a n t  t o  take t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  f o r  f e a r  of e i t h e r  arousing 
t h e  i s o l a t i o n i s t s  o r  of pushing the  United S t a t e s  Government 
t o o  f a r  t o o  fas t ,  thereby perhaps reducing any poss ib le  
chances of Anglo-American cooperation i n  t h e  area .  The 
American Government had, however, apparent ly  began t o  
undergo a change i n  i t s  a t t i t u d e  toward Anglo-American 
coopera t ion  upon rece iv ing  an unsa t i s fac to ry  rep ly  t o  i t s  
1 I b i d . ,  gp. 183-184, 
-
Note of October 6. 
On December 1 Lindsay, t h e  B r i t i s h  Ambassador i n  
Washington. r e p o r t e d  t h a t  the  Acting Secre tary  of S t a t e .  
fo l lowing up a similar statement by Sumner Welles, had 
s t a t e d  t h a t  Japanese pol icy  in  t h e  Far E a s t  showed t h a t  
t h e r e  w a s ,  
. . . i n c r e a s i n g  need f o r  Governments whose 
i n t e r e s t s  were threa tened t o  concert  economic 
a c t i o n  i n  t h e i r  defence. He indica ted  t h a t  
S t a t e  Department would be recep t ive  i f  wi th in  
a few weeks they  could l e a r n  any conclusions 
H i s  Majesty s Government might have reached. l 
Recognizing t h a t  t h i s  United S t a t e s  overture  might 
w e l l  become t h e  basis of f u t u r e  Anglo-American cooperation, 
Ha l i f ax  f ollowing up a similar message of t h e  previous day, 
i n s t r u c t e d  Lindsay on December 6 t o  inform t h e  Uhited S t a t e s  
Government t h a t  B r i t a i n  was considering t h e  establishment of 
a Chinese Currency S t a b i l i z a t i o n  Fund and t h a t ,  
H i s  Majes ty ls  Government's d e c i s i o n  on the  ques t ion  
of c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  currency s t a b i l i z a t i o n  loan would 
be g r e a t l y  inf luenced by t h e  knowledge t h a t  United 
S t a t e s  Government we e w i l l i n g  t o  t ake  p a r a l l e l  and 
s imultaneous a c t i o n .  h 
Hal i fax  having thus  put i n  a plug f o r  p a r a l l e l  
a c t i o n s ,  which he deemed s o  important,  received a wire on 
December 11 from Mr. Mallet ,  the  B i t l s h  Counsellor i n  
Washington, r e p o r t i n g  t h a t ,  "United S t a t e s  a u t h o r i t i e s  would 
'Ibld., - pp. 278-279. 
2 ~ b i d . ,  - p. 301. 
l i k e  t o  exchange information on what e l s e  has been, o r  is 
being,  done f o r  China by United S t a t e s  and United Kingdom 
1 
respec t ive ly .  
Mallet on December 19, re fe r r ing  t o  the  reoent $25 
m i l l i o n  United S t a t e s  c r ed i t  t o  China s t a t ed  t h a t ,  I1m own 
f e e l i n g  is t h a t  United S ta tes  Government having made t h e i r  
con t r ibu t ion  . . . w i l l  be disappointed i f  we do not soon 
fol low it up by some form of f inanc ia l  a i d  t o  ~ h l n a . ~ l ~  A 
few days later it appeared t h a t  he had perhaps assessed the  
s i t u a t i o n  oo r r ec t ly  when he reported t h a t ,  
Speaklng q u i t e  personally today Hornbeck Cmited 
S t a t e s  Department of S t a t e  Advisor on P o l i t i c a l  Rela- 
t i o n s 3  much hoped t h a t  w e  should now follow up 
American a c t i o n  by some ac t ion  of our own. 
he continued stating t h a t ,  
I f e e l  t h a t  from point of view of Anglo-American 
cooperat ion it i s  important t h a t  we should make some 
early announcement of wh tever  it Is decided t o  do t o  
he lp  Chinese Guvernment . 3 
The contention of 14allet that the  United S ta tes  
des i r ed  an  e a r l y  Br i t i sh  response w a s  borne out the f i r s t  
week of January 1939 a t  which time he w a s  again pressed by 
Hornbeck as t o  what s o r t  of ac t ion  Br i t a in  proposed t o  take. 
4 
A B r i t i s h  reply  was not long i n  coming. Two days 
l a t e r ,  on January 6 ,  Mallet was Instructed t o  inform the  
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Government of t h e  United S ta tes  t h a t  H i s  Ma j e s t y t s  Govern- 
ment had decided t o  introduce l e g i s l a t i o n  t h a t  would enable 
them t o  support t h e  Chinese Currency 
. . . provided t h a t  the  Uhlted S t a t e s  Govement  
a r e  prepared t o  take  p a r a l l e l  ac t ion  t o  support 
Chinese currency at  the  same time . . . knd t h a t 1  
The United S t a t e s  Government a r e  aware t ha t  we have 
a l ready  a l l oca t ed  t o  China about 
c r e d i t s  which w i l l  become 
Export Guarantees B i l l  is passed. I n  addi t ion t o  
t h i s  it is proposed t o  earmark, a t  l e a s t  a fu r the r  
two and a ha l f  mi l l ion  pounds t o  assist Chinese 
Government purchases i n  t h i s  country . . . This 
. . . should be regarded as our counterpart t o  t he  
commercial c r e d i t s  granted by the  United Sta tes  
Government last month. 
The B r i t i s h ,  then,  seem t o  have regarded the  grantinq 
of export c r e d i t s  as a counterpart t o  t he  United S t a t e s  
c r e d i t  t o  China. Moreover they seem t o  have regarded a 
currency loan as something en t i r e ly  separate and independent 
of t h e  c r e d i t  schemes and more dangerous and important. 
They appear t o  have been caught on the  horns of the  same 
dilemma they had been contending ~ i t h  f o r  months. They f e l t  
t h a t  p a r a l l e l  Anglo-American a c t  ion w a s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e i r  
meeting with any success i n  t h e i r  Far Eastern object ives 
without incurring too  g rea t  a r i s k .  Craigie very ap t ly  
e x p r e s s e d  t h i s  a t t i t u d e  when he s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
Important  t h i n g  is t h a t  we should do  nothing by 
o u r s e l v e s  which would i n c u r  t h e  r i s k  of w a r  . . . 
I do f e e l  t h a t  it is  of t h e  very h ighes t  importance 
t h a t  a t  every s t e p  t h e  United S t a t e s  should take  
p a r a l l e l  a c t i o n  wi th  Great  B r i t a i n  and v i c e  versa.  
B u t  on t h e  o t h e r  hand s h e  did not  want t o  do  anything which 
might  t e n d  t o  d e f l e c t  the  United S t a t e s  from i ts  recen t  
s t i f f e n i n g  of a t t i t u d e  toward Japan. Halifax expressed t h i s  
c o n s i d e r a t  i o n  i n  m i d -  January when he s t a t e d  : 
I cons ide r  t h a t  our  a i m  must be a c t i v e  Anglo- 
American co-operat  i o n  wherever poss ib le ,  and w e  
must be c a r e f u l  t o  do  nothing which might jeopardize 
t h e  movement i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  f o r  co l l abora t ion  
w i t h  like-minded Gwernments i n  Europe, which has 
a l r e a d y  gone beyond what appeared l i k e l y  a few 
months agoe2  
However by t h e  end of January Mallet repor ted  t h a t  
t h e  United S t a t e s  Gwernment, while it d i d  not  r u l e  out the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of such a c t i o n ,  would not promise any p a r a l l e l  
and s imul taneous  a c t i o n  i f  B r i t a i n  were t o  make the proposed 
cur rency  loan .  H e  added t h a t ,  
What must be avoided a t  a l l  cos t s  is any h i n t  of 
c o l l u s i o n  between our two Governments. Congress is 
i n  a s u s p i c i o u s  mood and would make endless  d i f f i -  
c u l t i e s  i f  t h i s  i d e a  3o t  about.3 
Never the less  t h e  Currency S t a b i l i z a t i o n  B i l l  was sub- 
m i t t e d  t o  Par l iament  and passed during March 1939, thereby 
i n  a s e n s e  p lac ing  t h e  B r i t i s h  i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of leading i n  
I I b i d . ,  pp. 261-262. 
-
J I b i d . ,  
t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  a l though  not  without hes i t a t ion .  
Thus t h e  s i t u a t i o n  which d id  develop was one i n  which 
B r i t a i n ,  whi le  e age r  t o  have t h e  United S t a t e s  take a  
s t i f f e r  l i n e  as r ega rds  Japan and t o  become ac t i ve ly  involved 
w i t h  h e r s e l f  i n  J o i n t  measures oa lcula ted  t o  f u r t h e r  t h e  
a i m s  of bo th  Powers, w a s  very he s i t an t  t o  take measures of 
consequence u n l e s s  they  were taken i n  p a r a l l e l  with the  
United S t a t e s ,  This  being because she feared arousing the  
wra th  of Japan t o  t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  her inadequacy i n  t h i s  
area would be bared f o r  a l l  t o  see ,  The United S ta tes  while 
q u i t e  w i l l i n g  t o  exchange ideas ,  information, e t c , ,  avoided 
p a r a l l e l  measures which would be in te rp re ted  at  home as 
Anglo-American coopera t ion  o r  col lusion,  She d id  i n  many 
ca se s  s e e  eye t o  eye with Br i t a in  as what measures should be 
t aken  but  p r e f e r r e d  t h a t  such ac t ions  be taken on an 
i n d i v i d u a l  basis and not  i n  pa r a l l e l .  B r i t a in  was t ry ing  t o  
avo id  J u s t  such a s i t u a t i o n .  Br i t a in  wanted t o  take such 
measures as might arouse  Japan only i n  c lose  and open 
coope ra t i on  wi th  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  thereby, they f e l t ,  
minimizing t h e  a t t e n d a n t  r i s k s .  
It cannot be s a i d  t h a t  e i t h e r  B r i t a in  or  the  United 
S t a t e s  w a s  c l e a r l y  leading the  other. The B r i t i s h  policy of 
no t  appear ing  t o  prod o r  push the United S ta tes  i n t o  ac t i on  
i n  many case s  l eaves  t he  appearance t ha t  it indeed was the  
United States which was doing the  leading. However, c lose  
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examination of t h e  l i n e  of thought of t he  pr incipal  Br i t i sh  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  as displayed In  t h e i r  wires of t h i s  period, 
shows that they f e l t  they were attempting t o  subtly lead the  
United States, while outwardly maintaining an  a t t i t u d e  of 
watchfu l  wait ing.  Consequently one i s  faced with the  
d e c i s i o n  of whether B r i t i s h  thoughtand a t t i t u d e  did have an 
e f f e c t  on t h e  American decis ions  t o  take such act ions  as 
t h e y  took,  and, whether t he  Br i t i sh  considered themselves t o  
be l ead ing ,  I f  only  i n  thought. 
CHAPTER TV 
WAS BRITAIN TREATED LESS WELL AT TIIE HANDS OF 
JAPAN THAN WAS THE UNITED STATES? 
The B r i t i s h .  as 1s ehown i n  Chapter 111, strongly 
d e s i r e d  cooperat ion with the United S ta tes  i n  the Far E a s t  
f o r  t h e  Purpose of thwarting Japan i n  securing her objec- 
t i v e s ,  whether psychological ly or  economically, i n  r e l a t i v e  
s a f e t y .  The B r i t i s h  of course desired the cooperation of 
t h e  United S t a t e s  because of her  undisputed economic and 
m i l i t a r y  power. The United S t a t e s  being by f a r  the l a rges t  
t r a d e r  w l t h  Japan, conceivably had the a b i l i t y  t o  s t r i k e  a 
s e v e r e  blow a t  t h e  l a t t e r  should she choose t o  do so. More- 
ove r  the  United S t a t e s  w a s  not occupied a t  any point with 
l a r g e  military commitments o r  s t r a i n s  whereas Japan was 
enqaged i n  a l a r g e  s c a l e  w a r  on the  Asian mainland. By con- 
trast B r i t i s h  t r ade  wlth Japan while ce r ta in ly  not ins ignif -  
i c a n t ,  d i d  no t  reach the  proportions of American t rade .  In 
a d d i t i o n  B r i t a i n ,  aga in  i n  contras t  t o  the United S ta tes ,  
d i d  have s i g n i f  i c a n t  vested i n t e r e s t s  i n  China--Interests 
which i n  t h e  event  of war, would cause considerable f r i c t i o n  
between t h e  conquering Japanese au tho r i t i e s  and the Br i t i sh .  
The B r i t i s h  were of the  opinion t h a t  the United 
S t a t e s  was r ece iv ing  b e t t e r  treatment as regards a f f a i r s  i n  
China a t  t h e  hands of the  Japanese than they. Craigie a s  
e a r l y  as t h e  beginning of September 1938 s t a t ed  t h a t ,  
. . . a l l  r e p o r t s  reaching me indicate  tha t  there 
has f o r  some time and as a general  ru le  been more 
f r i e n d l y  co-operation between United S ta tes  and 
Japanese a u t h o r i t i  s i n  China than between Br i t i sh  
and Japanese . . . f 
A s  a n  I l l u s t r a t i o n  of the  degree t o  which prefer- 
e n t i a l  t r ea tment  w a s  being accorded the  United S ta tes ,  M r .  
Jamieson ( t h e  B r i t i s h  Consul i n  Tients ln)  viewing w i t h  
i n c r e a s i n g  concern t h e  r i s i n g  tension between the  Japanese 
a u t h o r i t i e s  and those of t h e  Br i t i sh  Concession i n  Tientsin,  
recommended t h a t  it would be advisable i n  the event of a 
c r i s i s  t o  t ake  the  women and children,  l1 . . . and put them 
under t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  of the  American f lag .  I f 2  He evidently 
f e l t  t h a t  the  Japanese respect  f o r  the United S ta tes  was 
such t h a t  even B r i t i s h  subjects  i f  pleced under the protec- 
t i o n  of t h e  American flag would not be harmed, whereas i f  
t h o s e  same people were under the Br i t i sh  flag they very well 
might be. 
Hal i fax  noted t h a t ,  " In  the past  the  Japanese have 
shown some d i s p o s i t i o n  t o  t r e a t  American demands with 
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g r e a t e r  cons idera t ion  than British.I1 Craigie on October 13 
i n  r e p l y  s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
While it is a n  e s s e n t i a l  part of the  Japanese policy 
t o  c o n c i l i a t e  American i n t e r e s t s  I a m  not aware of any 
concre te  ins tance  i n  which a concession made i n  favour 
of American i n t e r e s t s  has been withheld from us. 1 
Throughout t h e  period, the  fee l ing tha t  the VPlited 
S t a t e s  w a s  r ece iv ing  b e t t e r  treatment by Japan than was 
B r i t a i n  con t inua l ly  shows i t s e l f .  It was indeed shown i n  
C r a i g i e  s r e p l y  t o  Halifax concerning the Japanese treatment 
of B r i t i s h  demands and p ro t e s t s  when he s t a t ed  on November 3 
t h a t ,  
I may add t h a t  complaints of other foreign Govern- 
ments have f a r e d  no b e t t e r  than ours and it is  t o  my 
mind remarkable t h a t  with a l l  the Japanese des i re  t o  
p r o p i t i a t e  t h e  United S ta tes  a t  a l l  cos ts  so l i t t l e  
s a t i s f a c  i on  has h i t h e r t o  been granted t o  American 
demands. h 
The Japanese, a t  l e a s t  from the Br i t i sh  point of 
view, he ld  t h e  B r i t i s h  t o  be the primary Power obstructing 
t h e  p rog res s  of events  i n  China i n  the  manner i n  which the  
former  wished them t o  proceed. Craigie expressed t h i s  while 
commenting on negot ia t ions  between the Shanghai Municipal 
Council  and t h e  Japanese au tho r i t i e s  when he s ta ted  t h a t ,  
". . . t h e  Japanese Government s trongly hold the  view t h a t  
o p p o s i t i o n  [to var ious  Japanese proposed measurea centers 
i n  B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  . . . n 
3 
The B r i t i s h  seemed t o  f e e l  tha t  i n  addit ion t o  t h e i r  
being regarded as being qu i t e  obstructive by the Japanese 
when it came t o  the  r e a l i z a t i o n  of t h e i r  plans fo r  China, 
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t h e y  were a l s o  regarded as one of the  causes of the con- 
t i n u e d  Chinese r e s i s t ance  t o  Japanese mil i tary  might. A s  
C ra ig i e  pu t  it on August 12, Ekltain w a s  regarded by Japan, 
. . . as t h e  Power held by Japanese public t o  be the arch- 
s u p p o r t e r  of t h e  Chiang regime.tt 1 
Hal i fax  seemed t o  have t h i s  same point i n  mind when 
w r i t i n g  t o  Craigie  about the  v io len t  anti-Bri t ish a t t i t u d e  
of t h e  Japanese press .  He, i n  f a c t ,  suggested tha t  Craigie 
approach Pr ince  Konoya, who was then Prime Minister and a l s o  
Acting Minis te r  f o r  Foreign Affai rs  i n  the absence of a 
successo r  t o  General Ugaki, on, 
. . . t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of controlling the present 
a n t i - B r i t i s h  press  campaign. I rea l ize  of course 
t h a t  i t  is t h e  f ixed  bel ief  of the Japanese i n  the 
e f f i c a c y  of t he  a l leged  Br i t i sh  support of Chiang 
Kai-shek which is the mainspring of t h i s  campaign 
0 . .  
2 
While Craigie and his B r i t i s h  colleagues did f e e l  
t h a t  B r i t a i n  w a s  d e f i n i t e l y  being t reated l e s s  well than the 
United S t a t e s  they d id  not ,  a t  l e a s t  according t o  the docu- 
ments which a r e  published, point out any spec i f ic  cases i n  
which t h i s  d i d  i n  f a c t  occur. However the Japanese did 
d e t a i n  H i s  HaJes ty l s  Ships 'RobinJ and Cicalal on t h e  J e s t  
River  above Canton t o  such an extent t h a t  Craigie was forced 
t o  p r o t e s t  t h i s  a c t i o n  w i t h  the  r e s u l t  t h a t  he was able t o  
2 ~ b i d . ,  - pp. 118-119. 
r e p o r t  o n  October 31, 1938 t h a t  the  Japanese a u t h o r i t i e s  had 
t o l d  h i m ,  . . . t h a t  I t h a  sh ips  should not have been 
1 d e t a i n e d ,  that  it must be due t o  a mistake . . . I n  addi- 
t i o n  t o  t h i s  a c t i o n  of t h e  Japanese, H.M.S. 'Sandpiper' w a s  
a t t a c k e d  by Japanese planes at Changsha on October 24, 1938 
r e s u l t i n g  I n  r e l a t i v e l y  l i g h t  damage and no casual t ies .  
R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h i s  a t t a c k ,  Hal ifax s t a t e d  i n  a wire t o  
C r a i g i e  c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  t e x t  of a note from t h e  former which 
he was t o  d e l i v e r  t o  t h e  Japanese, t h a t ,  
There can  be no doubt t h a t  the  a t t a c k  was both 
unwarranted and i n  d i s rega rd  of the  assurances . . . 
of M r .  H i r o t a ' s  Note of the  28th December, 1937 [on 
t h e  s h e l l i n g  of H. M.S. 'Ladybird' on December 12, 
19371. The circumstances were such as t o  c rea te  t h e  
i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  t h e  bombs were aimed a t  t h i s  gunboat; 
and i n  view of h e r  c l e a r  markings, the excel len t  
v i s i b i l i t y  and t h e  low a l t i t u d e  of the  a i r c r a f t ,  he r  
t r u e  c h a r a c t e r  cannot have been in any doubt .2 
The Japanese  o f f e r e d  only apologies,  nothing more, Noting 
t h i s  H a l i f a x  continued s t a t i n g  t h a t ,  
H i s  Majes ty ' s  Government have k e n  glad t o  rece ive  
th rough  t h e  Vice-Minister f o r  Foreign Af fa i r s  b n  
October  2 4  and t h e  Japanese Embassy i n  London bn 
October 253 a n  express ion  of deep reg re t  on t h e  p a r t  
of t h e  Japanese Government. They f e e l ,  however, t h a t  
t h e  c i rcumstances  c a l l  f o r  more s u b s t a n t i a l  amends ,  
and t h e y  must r eques t  a formal expression of r e g r e t  
i n  w r i t i n g ,  t o g e t h e r  with an undertaking by the 
Japanese  Government t o  defray the  cos t  of the 
n e c e s s a r y  r e p a i r s .  and an assurance t h a t  the  
a p p r o p r i a t e  d l s c l p l i h a r y  measures w i l l  be taken. 3 
Although t h e  B r i t i s h  Government c lea r ly  f e l t  t ha t  the 
Japanese  express ion  of r eg re t  had been qu i t e  perfunctory, 
C r a i g i e  urged t h a t  f o r  reasons of b e t t e r  cooperation with 
1 t h e  Japanese  i n  o ther  a reas ,  the matter be se t t l ed  on a 
l o c a l  basis, which It ul t imate ly  was and which did  inci-  
2 d e n t l y  r e s u l t  I n  t h e  cos t  of r epa i r  being borne by Japan. 
During the e a r l y  pa r t  of the period the Br i t i sh  had 
been rather unwil l ing t o  take any act ions  which might pro- 
voke t h e  Japanese t o  take ac t ion  which would fur ther  increase 
t h e  t e n s i o n s  between the  two Powers. However as the attl-  
t u d e  of t h e  United S t a t e s  began t o  s t i f f e n ,  and, as it began 
t o  approach B r i t a i n  with a view towards cooperation, the 
B r i t i s h  a t t i t u d e  as t o  what s o r t s  of act ions could be taken 
w i t h  r ega rd  t o  Japan began t o  change. With the Br i t i sh  
f e e l i n g  t h a t  Japan w a s  g i v i m  the  United Sta tes  p re fe ren t ia l  
t r e a t m e n t ,  they des i r ed  t o  a c t  i n  concert with the l a t t e r  i n  
t h e  hope t h a t  i n  such a manner they would perhaps place 
Japan i n  such a p o s i t i o n  as t o  be able t o  do nothing against 
B r i t a i n  without  a l s o  being forced t o  follow s u i t  as regards 
t h e  United S t a t e s .  Craigie i n  a sense voiced t h i s  opinion 
wh i l e  commenting on the  probable Japanese react ion t o  a pro- 
posed j o i n t  United S ta tes -Sr i t i sh  currency loan t o  China 
when he s t a t e d  t h a t  the ,  
Usual indignant  press a r t i c l e s  would appear but 
s o  anxious a r e  t h e  Japanese t o  p rop i t i a te  the  United 
S t a t e s  t h a t  no cou ter -act ion of any descr ip t ion i s  
t o  be an t i c ipa t ed .  !t 
The Uhited S t a t e s  on December 15, 1938 announced a 
twenty-five mi l l i on  d o l l a r  c r ed i t  t o  China, which w a s  d is -  
2 gulsed as a commercial venture. The Japanese Minister f o r  
Foreign Af fa i r s ,  Arita, Cralgie reported, had re fe r red  t o  it 
3 
as, It . . . purely a t rade  proposition . . .** Kerr re fe r -  
r i n g  t o  t h e  Japanese r e a c t i o n  t o  t h i s  c red i t  s t a ted  t h a t ,  
ll 
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"They have taken t h e  American c r ed i t s  l y i n g  down . . . 
Although t h e  B r i t i s h  d id  want joint Anglo-American 
a c t i o n  f o r  reasons a l ready discussed, Craigie d id  not f e e l  
t h a t  t h e  probable Japanese react ions t o  any joint measures 
would be i d e n t i c a l  vis-a-vis  Br i ta in  and the  United S ta tes ,  
In f a c t  he s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
P a r a l l e l  a c t i o n  promised by United S t a t e s  would be 
most valuable but it must be remembered t h a t  f o r  
t a c t i c a l  reasons Japanese w i l l  t r y  t o  make out t h a t  
our a c t i o n  is more detr imental  t o  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  
t han  any American act ion.  5 
American p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t he  establishment of a pro- 
posed Chinese currency s t a b i l i z a t i o n  fund or some ac t ion  
along somewhat similar l i n e s  was, however not forthcoming. 
Hence B r i t a i n  proceeded with the plan i n  concert with no 
o t h e r  Powers. 
In early March 1939 they made public the establish- 
ment of t h e  Fund. Craigie,  noting the Japanese reaction, 
s t a t e d :  
. . . t h e  outward react ions  i n  t h i s  country t o  the 
es tab l i shment  of t he  Chinese Currency Stabi l iza t ion 
F'und have been l e s s  v io l en t  than might have been 
a n t i c i p a t e d  . . This comparatively calm reception 
is doub t l e s s  due, t o  some extent ,  t o  the greater  
imminence of t h e  ser ious  problem of the f i sher ies  
d i s p u t e  wlth Soviet  Russia . . bn addition) The 
Japanese Government are a l s o  placed In  the quandary 
t h a t ,  If they make t o o  heavy weather of t h i s  develop- 
ment, they  automatical ly convey t o  the public mind 
t h e  impression t h a t  a ser ious  check has been adminis- 
t e r e d  t o  t h e i r  hopes f o r  an ear ly  peace-the very last 
impress ion they wish t o  convey I n  present circumstances. 
But I a m  t o l d  t h a t ,  beneath the surface, the resent- 
ment i n  r eac t iona ry  and extremist c i r c l e s  is very 
s t r o n g  and ways of ge t t i ng  even with us a re  beinq 
f r e e l y  discussed . . . bnd i n  the press) leader 
w r i t e r s  have seen i n  the creation of t h e  Fund a 1 
f r o n t a l  a t t a c k  aga ins t  Japan's 'new order1 policy. . 
Cralg le  i n  e a r l y  December 1938 summed up why i n  h i s  
view B r i t a i n  was being t rea ted  i n  a more shabby manner than 
t h e  United S t a t e s .  H e  began by s t a t ing  t h a t ,  
I n  es t imat ing probable Japanese reactions t o  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  B r i t  1 s h  movement it is perhaps desirable 
t o  bear  following i n  mind: annoyance shown by 
Japanese naval  and mi l i t a ry  o f f i ce r s  a t  B r i t i s h  pro- 
t e s t s  o r  t h r e a t s  I n  contras t  t o  comparative calmness 
wi th  which s i m i l a r  representations from Americans or 
Russians a r e  received is a t t r i bu ted  a t  l eas t  i n  part  
t o  t h e i r  f e e l i n g  t h a t  our weakness i n  the F a r  *st 
does no t  e n t i t l e  us s o  frequently t o  use such language 
In cases ,  many of which appear t o  Japanese of compara- 
t i v e  minor importance. 
I I b i d . ,  
-
Good r e l a t i o n s  with America moreover a r e  a matter  
of p o l i c y  and from Russia they expect h o s t i l l t y .  
They require a whipping-boy t o  blame f o r  the con- 
t i n u e d  r e s i s t a n c e  of China : Disappointment w e r  
our  sympathy with China combines .with Jealousy ofl 
our  p o s i t i o n  t o  c a s t  Great B r i t a i n  f o r  t h a t  r o l e .  
The B r i t i s h  q u i t e  obviously d id  f e e l  t h a t  they were 
be ing  t r e a t e d  worse than the  Americans, however t h i s  seems 
t o  have been more of a f ee l i ng  perhaps generated by infer- 
ences  such as a b i t  l e s s  Japanese patience with Br i t a i n ,  a 
tendency t o  be somewhat l e s s  anxious t o  smooth over d i f -  
f i c u l t i e s  which were generated between the two Powers and 
o the r  s u b t l i e s  such as these  r a t h e r  than b la ten t  and open 
2 d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  Craigie acknowledged t h a t  he knew of no 
i n s t a n c e  I n  which favors  which had been granted the United 
S t a t e s  had been denied Br i t a in .  The B r i t i s h  of course hav- 
ing much more widespread i n t e r e s t s  and hence presence i n  
China than t h e  United S t a t e s  w a s  accordinqly l a i d  open t o  a 
g r e a t e r  degree f o r  t h e  development of d i spu tes  w i t h  Japan. 
The United S t a t e s  however d id  assume a much l a r g e r  
r o l e  i n  the trade with  Japan than  did S r i t a i n  and Japan 
acco rd ing ly ,  one would assume, would have been more unwill- 
i ng  t o  t a k e  s t e p s  which might cause t h e  l o s s  of t h i s  valu- 
a b l e  source  of suppl ies .  
Thus one might conclude t h a t  although the B r i t i s h  
probably d i d  have a v a l i d  complaint, it was something In 
l ~ b l d . ,  - pp. 302-303. 
2 ~ b i d . ,  - p. 136. 
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which I t  was very d i f f i c u l t  t o  pinpoint spec i f ic  instances. 
The most one could point t o  would be the general Japanese 
a t t i t u d e  as displayed i n  the press. It was more of a 
Japanese reluctance t o  deal with the Bri t i sh  i n  a s a t i s -  
f ac to ry  manner than the withholding of favors which were 
granted t o  the United States. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CRANGE IN CEIAIGIEIS VIEWS 
B r i t i s h  po l i cy  vis-a-vis both Japan and China from 
~ u g u s t  1938 t o  ?larch of 1939 was, i n  C r a i g i e f s  view, f f  . . . 
t o  ma in ta in  f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  with both b e l l i g e r e n t s  with- 
out  g i v i n g  e i t h e r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  when peace comes f o r  claim- 
1 ing t h a t  we have unduly favored the  other." He f u r t h e r  
poin ted  out  on November 4 t h a t ,  
Our po l i cy  has been t o  play f o r  time i n  t h e  expecta- 
t i o n  t h a t  both s i d e s  w i l l  eventually become s u f f i -  
c i e n t l y  exhausted t o  permit of our helping t o  bring 
about  a reasonable set t lement  of t h i s  t r a g i c  c o n f l i c t .  
We have, t h e r e f  o re ,  s e t  ourselves the  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  
of maintaining our r e l a t i o n s  with e i t h e r  s i d e  upon as 
f a v o r a b l e  a f o o t i n g  as possible.2 
Refe r r ing  t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered, In a c t u a l  
p r a c t i c e ,  of reaching any understandim with the  Japanese 
which would a l low both t h e  l a t t e r  t o  pursue t h e i r  objec t ives  
and of a l lowing t h e  B r i t i s h  t o  follow the  aforesa id  pol icy 
while a t  t h e  same time maintaining such a course as would 
not  e n t a i l  any breach of ex i s t ing  t r e a t i e s  or  p r i n c i p l e s ,  he 
s t a t e d :  
Although, during t h e  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  our r e spec t ive  
p o i n t s  of view may be i r r econc i l ab le ,  it is  poss ib le  
t o  f o r s e e  a poin t  of convergence i n  the  event of a n  
even tua l  se t t l ement  of which we a r e  i n  a pos i t ion  t o  
approve. 3 
With such  an end i n  mind he recommended t h a t ,  I t I  should pre- 
f er  t o  p u t  u p  w i t h  temporary l o s s e s  . . . i n  order t h a t  we 
may p l a y  o u r  p r o p e r  p a r t  during t h e  peace negot iat ions and 
1 
 afterward^.^^ Although having s t a t e d  what he believed 
B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  t o  be,  and, having pointed out I n  genera l  t h e  
p r o b a b l e  manner of execut ion  t o  reach t h e  des i red  end, he 
added t h a t ,  "As t o  whether we s h a l l ,  I n  f a c t ,  be a b l e  t o  
e x e r t  o u r  i n f l u e n c e  i n  br inging about a reasonable s e t t l e -  
ment, I would h e s i t a t e  t o  hazard a predic t ion  a t  t h i s  
2 
s t a g e .  
During t h e  f i rs t  few months of the  period under con- 
s i d e r a t i o n  C r a i g i e  was involved In a s e r i e s  of conversations 
w i t h  a view toward s o l v i n g  o r  a t  l e a s t  lessening some of t h e  
t e n s  ion arising ou t  of t h e  Anglo-Japanese dispute  which had 
emanated from t h e  c o n f l i c t  i n  China. However by t h e  begin- 
n i n g  of August 1938 t h e s e  conversations were losing momentum 
w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  were obtaining l i t t l e  satis- 
f a c t i o n  from them. With t h i s  i n  mind Craigie i n  the  l a t t e r  
part of August s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
It would be easy  t o  conclude t h a t  Japanese Govern- 
ment are merely seeking t o  g a i n  time but t h i s  is cer- 
t a i n l y  no t  t h e  whole s t o r y .  General Ugaki b i n l s t e r  
f o r  F o r e i g n  ~ f f a i r s )  w i t h  memories of h i s  r e j ec t ion  
by t h e  army as Prime Minis te r ,  has s t i l l  many p o l i t i c a l  
enemies who have r e c e n t l y  shown s igns  of mobilizing 
p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  a g a i n s t  him i n  connection wi th  our 
I 
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conve r sa t ions  H i s  very reputa t  ion f o r  broadminded- 
n e s s  is wainst him f o r  he IS now being accused i n  
c i r c l e s  extending beyond normal react ionary ones of 
p r e p a r i n g  t o  y i e l d  t o  Eiritish pressure. Furthermore h i s  f r l e n d s  i n  t h e  Government a r e  most anxious t o  
a v o i d  e x p o s i w  him t o  t h i s  kind of a t t ack .  The above f a c t o r s  coupled with  Mr. Chamberlinls recent  s t a t e -  
ments @ha t  a l though t h e  B r i t i s h  Government was not 
p repa red  t o  g r a n t  o r  guarantee a loan  t o  China, 
o t h e r  Chinese proposals f o r  a s l i s t a n c e  were being 
examinedl i n  Parl iament a r e  su f f  i c l e n t  t o  explain  
t h e  check t o  negot . ia t ions  which I am now more hope- 
f u l  may prove t o  be temporary. 
I n  the  light of t h e  above I hope it may be poss ible  
f o r  o u r  p r e s s  (and p a r t i c u l a r l y  'The Timesf) t o  d i s -  
p l a y  s p e c i a l  d i s c r e t i o n  i n  commenting during t h e  next 
f o r t n i g h t  on Far  Eas te rn  a f f a i r s  and preferably t o  
make no f u r t h e r  re fe rence  at a l l  t o  my conversations 
w i t h  M i n i s t e r  f o r  Foreign Affairs .  I cannot too  of ten  
o r  t o o  s t r o n g l y  emphasize t h a t  v io l en t  c r i t i c i s m  of 
Japan and h i n t s  of economic pressure do inf  i n i t e  harm 
because t h e y  undermine t h e  pos i t ion  of our f r iends  and 
are d i s c u s s e d  by our enemies as e i t h e r  bluff  o r  being 
d e r o g a t o r y  t o  Japan 's  d ign i ty .  l 
C r a i g i e ,  wi th  B r i t i s h  policy as he understood it, was 
of t h e  op in ion  t h a t  General Maki and many of the  other  
Governmental p o l i c y  makers were s incere ly  desirous of reach- 
ing a n  amicable  understanding with the  Br i t i sh  but were 
handicapped by t h e  more r ad i ca l  elements i n  posi t ions  of 
a u t h o r i t y  i n  both Government and t h e  Mi l i t a ry .  In  such c i r -  
cumstances he  was anxious t o  do nothing t o  weaken the  posi- 
t i o n  of the more moderate elements while conversely he 
d e s i r e d  t o  d o  a l l  t h a t  was possible t o  strengthen t h e i r  
P o s i t i o n .  He accordingly requested from time t o  time t h a t  
v i o l e n t  m i t i s h  c r i t i c i s m  of Japan i n  both the  press and 
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~ o v e r n m e n t a l  c i r c l e s  be avoided as much as posbible as i t  
~ a u s e d  more harm than  a l l  e l se .  Pursuing t h i s  l i n e  he 
s t a t e d  on August 31 t h a t ,  
It would be wrong t o  assume t h a t  statements made 
i n  Par l iament  a r e  simply being used by the Government 
as p r e t e x t  f o r  delay.  I have abundant evidmce t h a t  
r e a c t i o n  on Japanese publ ic  opinion was genuine . . . 
a f t e r  t h e  news bf t h e  B r i t i s h  r e fusa l  of the  Chinese 
l o a n 3  had been received here he c ~ a k f )  gave me more 
e x p l i c i t  assurances  than I had received a t  any time 
t h a t  a long s t e p  was t o  be taken t o  meet our demands 
. . . and I a m  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  h i s  hope and in ten t ion  
a t  t h e  t ime were genuine. But h i s  des i r e  t o  explo i t  
l o a n s  d e c i s i o n  s o  as t o  f a c i l i t a t e  set t lement with us 
w a s  s h a t t e r e d  by publ ic  (and pa r t i cu l a r ly  ~ i l i t a r y )  
r e c e p t i o n  of speeches i n  Parliament .l 
Furthermore i f  such a course were t o  be followed which, i f  
any th ing ,  s t rengthened  the  pos i t ion  of t h e  moderates, 
C r a i g i e  s t a t e d  t h a t ,  I1Recourse t o  Br i t i sh  good o f f i ce s  I 
b e l i e v e  t o  be one of Minister  f o r  Foreign Affai rs1  objec- 
t i v e s  provided t h a t  some means can be found t o  reduce ex i s t -  
i ng  t e n s i o n  between t h e  two countrles.n2 With t h i s  i n  mind 
he f u r t h e r  s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
. . . I venture  t o  suggest t h a t  General @aki Is  
e loquen t  appea l  t h a t  both countr ies  should take s tock 
of t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  pos i t ions  should not pass 
unanswered. Suggest ion sometimes made t h a t  we can 
choose ou r  own moment t o  l ay  foundation of a fu tu re  
r app~oachemen t  w i t h  Japan is . . . a most dangerous 
one. J 
C r a i g i e  saw not  only a need f o r  a more t o l e r a n t  i f  
n o t  c o n c i l i a t o r y  mood toward Japan t o  be displayed i n  the 
6 3 
B r i t i s h  Isles themselves ,  bu t  a l s o  by t h e  B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  
i n  China.  Indeed ,  i n  China l a y  t h e  crux of t h e  present  
Anglo-Japanese d i f f  i c u l t i e s .  B r i t i s h  opinion a t  home only 
r e f l e c t e d  t h e  e x t e n t  of Anglo-Japanese d i f f i c u l t y  i n  China. 
I f  t h e  d i s p u t e s  i n  China could be s e t t l e d  i n  a manner satis- 
f a c t o r y  t o  b o t h  s i d e s ,  without thereby a l i ena t ing  t h e  
Chinese  o r  o t h e r  t h i r d  Powers, o r  if an agreement could be 
a r r i v e d  a t  which would s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  handle a l l  f u t u r e  d i s -  
a g r e e m e n t s ,  t h e n  t h e  mutual antagonism then being r e f l e c t e d  
i n  b o t h  homelands would melt away. Craigie, r e f l e c t i n g  t h i s  
v i e w  when d e a l i n g  wi th  t h e  i s s u e  of the  r e s to ra t ion  of f u l l  
Mun ic ipa l  Counci l  c o n t r o l  over the  In te rna t iona l  Sett lement 
i n  Shangha i  s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
I r e a l i z e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  many d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  the  
way of . . . r e s t o r a t i o n  of f u l l  Municipal Council 
a u t h o r i t y  I n  Hongkew and Yangtzepoo but I hope t h a t  
t h i s  c o n s t r u t i v e  proposal  cof t he  Japanese Minister  
f o r  F o r e i g n  ~ f f a i r q  w i l l  be considered not only 
f rom the  a n g l e  of l o c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  but a l s o  I n  the  
l i g h t  o f  g e n e r a l  i n t e r n a t  i ona l  s i t u a t i o n  and impor- 
t a n c e  of g e t t i n g  our  r e l a t i o n s  with t h i s  country on 
a b e t t e r  f o o t i n g .  I a l s o  be l ieve  a prompt s e t t l e -  
ment of Northern a r e a  (of Shanghai In te rna t iona l  
~ e t t  l e m e n t l  q u e s t i o n  on tasis of Mlnlster  f o r  Foreign 
A f  f airs ' proposa l  would open up b e t t e r  p o s s l b i l i t l e s  
f o r  s e t t l e m e n t  of o the r  outstanding d l f f l c u l t l e s . l  
Pu r su ing  t h i s  l i n e  of thought fu r the r .  but taking a 
d i f f e r e n t  t a c k  he  s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
G e n e r a l l y  speaking i n  se t t lement  of outstanding 
difficulties we must, as we a r e  deal ing with 
O r i e n t a l s ,  be prepared t o  g lve  a l l t t l e  as wel l  as 
t o  take .  But a s l i g h t l y  more accommodating a t t i t u d e  in t h e s e  mat ters  should not,  I suggest, be classed 
as 'doing a d e a l  with the Japaneset. It is a mere q u e s t i o n  of f inding  a p rac t i ca l  solution of these 
d ~ f f l c u l t i e ~  without any corn romise on principle 
and f o r  pe r iod  of emergency, 
- - E 
In  conjunction with t h i s  he a l s o  s tated tha t ,  n . . , I must 
 lead f o r  a s l i g h t l y  l e s s  'stand pa t t  a t t i tude  a t  Shanghai." 2 
During t h e  course of the se r i e s  of interviews w i t h  
t h e  ~ i n i s t e r  f o r  Foreign Affairs i n  which Craigie was 
involved, t h e  Japanese had frequently urged that the B r i t i s h  
should 'co-operatef  w i t h  them, The Brit ish of course were 
wary of any form of co-operation wi th  the Japanese, 
e s p e c i a l l y  as it  might be interpreted i n  other quarters a s  
perhaps being a d e a l  which would a f fec t  the posit ion or  
i n t e r e s t s  of t h i r d  powers adversely. Craigie, however, even 
as l a t e  as November 4, 1938 had s tated tha t ,  
I venture  t o  think t h a t ,  a t  the present stage, 
Japan means by co-operation l i t t l e  more than sympathy 
wi th  Japanese aims and perhaps a somewhat l e s s  
uncompromising a t t i t u d e  in  the execution of our 
p o l i c y  and t h e  s e t t l i n g  of our differences i n  
China. I a m  convinced tha t  it would be both unwise 
and dangerous were we posit ivelg t o  re jec t  t h i s  
appeal .  We should not,  f o r  example, go out of our 
Way t o  c r i t i c i z e  Japan, e i the r  in  Parliament or the  
p ress .3  
As Craig ie  was urging s teps upon the B r i t i s h  Govern- 
ment which would i n  h i s  view demonstrate t o  the Japanese 
t h a t  B r i t a i n  w a s  indeed sincere in  her o f t  expressed des i re  
' ~ b l d . ,  - pp. 122-123. 
3 ~ b i d . ,  - pp. 188-189. 
65 
t o  r e a c h  a mutual ly  s a t i s f a c t o r y  understandim with t he  
~ a p a n e s e  on China, he  Was a l s o  thinking t h a t  t h i s  s o r t  of 
t a c k  would demonstra te  t o  t he  Japanese au tho r i t i e s  i n  mow0 
t h a t  a good d e a l  of t h e i r  information about Br i t i sh  behavior 
and i n t e n t i o n s  emanat1n.g from Qlina was misleading. AS 
C r a i g l e  p u t  It, 
The l o c a l  Japanese a u t h o r i t i e s  Qn  him> hape 
succeeded by much hard lying i n  convincing t h e i r  
Government t h a t  no t  only a r e  Br i t i sh  a u t h o r i t i e s  
g e n e r a l l y  obs t ruc t ive  and unhelpful but they have 
a c t u a l l y  viewed with a not unfriendly eye t e r r o r i s t  
act i v i t l e s  fomented by agencies of the  Chinese Govern- 
ment. Th i s  . . . f a l s e  propaganda is In tu rn  p a r t l y  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  interminable delays In  s a t i s fy ing  
o u r  d e s i d e r a t a  and, unless th ings  go from bad t o  
worse, I most be placed i n  a posi t ion t o  counteract 
it .l 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  attempting t o  create  an easing of 
Anglo-Japanese t ens ion  f o r  the  sake of securing a possible 
unders tanding  t o  t h e  benef i t  of both Powers i n  China, 
C r a i g i e  a l s o  s a w  mer i t  i n  such a policy on a much broader 
f r o n t .  It appeared t o  him t h a t ,  
. . . it may become a matter of v i t a l  concern t o  
keep Japan from en te r ing  a war on the s ide  of our 
enemies and t o  achieve t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  purpose no 
o p p o r t u n i t y  must be missed nor i n  view of the  f a c t  
t h a t  c o n t r o l l e d  uapanesel) opinion is l i k e l y  t o  
c r y s t a l l i z e  very rap id ly  when a c r i t i c a l  moment 
a r r i v e s  i s  it wise t o  wait beyond eleventh hour 
be fo re  making conc i l i a to ry  overtures. 
C r a i g i e  was recommending a more co-operative' a t t i -  
tude as r e g a r d s  Japan i n  China and the  settlement of t he  
ensuing d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  s l n c e  t h i s  seemed t o  him t o  be the  
best method of accomplishing B r i t l s h  aims within t he  ex i s t -  
i n g  framework of B r i t l s h  pol icy as he understood it. He 
r e a l i z e d  t h a t ,  
, . . j o in t  o r  p a r a l l e l  ~ c o n o m i c  r e t a l i a t o r a  
a c t i o n  cwith t h e  United s t a t e 3  -- o r  the  th rea t  of 
such  ac t ion-- represents  the  only ce r t a i n  way open t o  
us of ensur ing  no t  only respect  f o r  exis t ing  f  oreign 
r i g h t s  and i n t e r e s t s  i n  China, but a l s o  the  maintenance 
of t h e  open door1 f o r  the fu tu re  .l 
However, r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  B r i t i s h  pol icy did not an t i c i pa t e  
t h e  employment of f o r c e f u l  means In t h e  Far E a s t  he urged 
t h a t ,  
. . . anything k n  t h e  statements of the  Br i t i sh  
Governmental leadersf smacking of a warning o r  a 
t h r e a t  should be avoided unless  i n  f a c t  we a r e  pre- 
pared promptly t o  make good our wordsS2 
Although during t h e  months Craigie was attempting t o  
s e c u r e  Japanese compliance w i t h  B r i t i s h  demands by urging 
t h a t  f u l l e r  a r i t i s h  'cooperation1 with the  former be entered 
I n t o ,  he  was by no means b l ind  t o  the  f a c t  t h a t  fo rce  might 
u l t i m a t e l y  be necessary t o  obta in  the desired ends. Craigie 
by mid-September 1938 had sensed t h a t  t h e  atmosphere was 
changing, Cra iq ie  point ing t h i s  phenomenon out,  s t a t e d  
t h a t ,  
Up t o  t h e  interview of the 27th Ju ly  I was hopeful 
of r e s u l t s ,  but ever  s ince  t h a t  da t e ,  the atmosphere 
has changed and General &ak l1 s  a t t i t u d e  has become 
t h a t  of . . . counsel f o r  the  defense. The keenness 
1 
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o r i g i n a l l y  observable t o  reach a set t lement sat 1s- 
f a c t o r y  t o  both s i d e s  has  been noticeably absent. 
The o s t e n s i b l e  reason was . . . t h e  e f f e c t  on publ ic  
op in ion  of t h e  statements made i n  Parliament . . 
b u t  . . t he se  . . statements cannot provide the 
whole exp lana t ion  of t h i s  anglophobla . . . . I 
t h i n k  t h a t  synchronisation of t he  time of 
Ambassadorts r e tu rn  tfrom ~ermanyl  and 
t h e  d a t e  from which the  s t i f f e n i n g  i n  the  Japanese 
became observable  can be mere coincidence . . . 
t h e  subsequent  i s sue  of the  statement of the 14th 
September de f in ing  the  Japanese a t t i t u d e  i n  the  
czechoslovak c r i s i s  and Prince Konoyats statement 
t o  t h e  p r e s s  t h a t  a strengthening of the  an t i -  
Cornintern pac t  was under consideration a l l  point  
i n  t h e  same d i r e c t i o n  of a strengthening of the  
1 German t i e  s i n c e  the  Ambassador returned t o  Tokyo. 
This  new a t t i t u d e  displayed by the  Japanese l e f t  Craigie 
even as e a r l y  as August 18, as he put it, 
. . . afraid moment is approaching when w e  must 
conclude t h a t  method of f r i end ly  negotiat ions here 
h a s  f a i l e d  and that such other  methocjs of pressure 
as a r e  a v a i l a b l e  must be t r i e d  . . . 
The tu rn ing  po in t  i n  Craigiet  s view apparently came 
with t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  of General saki a s  Minister f o r  
Fo re ign  Affairs, coupled with t he  Japanese Government 
s t a t emen t  of November 2 ,  1938 and Prince Konoyets statement 
of t h e  fo l lowing  day. Referring t o  these two statements he 
observed : 
The h i t h e r t o  vague conception of a ' t r i p a r t i t e  
b l o c t  has now received d e f i n i t e  o f f i c i a l  sanction 
. . . . The e a r l i e r  e x p l i c i t  and unreserved assur-  
a n c e s  of r e s p e c t  f o r  fo re ign  r l g h t s  and i n t e r e s t s  
have been watered down . . .it is wel l  t o  recognize 
t h a t  f o r  t h e  moment a t  l e a s t  we a re  faced with an  
 bid., - pp. 89-90. 
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impor tant  development i n  Japanese policy. 1 
S i m i l a r l y ,  r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  change Of top  personnel he s a i d  
t h a t  t h e ,  
S i t u a t i o n  i n  t h i s  r e spec t  C~apanese assurance& 
has now completely changed seeing t h a t  the Japanese 
Government have t o  a l l  i n t e n t s  and purposes repudiated 
t h e i r  own assurances  . . . J a p n e s e  who gave these 
a s s u r a n c e s  have been eliminated.2 
With t h i s  being t h e  case  he f e l t  t h a t ,  
. . . it w i l l  be neoessary a t  t h e  r i g h t  moment 
t o  demonst ra te  i n  t h e  c l e a r e s t  possible  way t h a t ,  
d e s p i t e  t h i s  change of f r o n t ,  we shall hold Japan 
t o  h e r  promises and s t a n  f i r m  by the  pr inc ip le  of 
' e q u a l  o p p o r t u n i t y f .  . . 9 
By t h e  end of November Crakgle had done a turnabout 
t o  t h e  e x t e n t  that he was now advocating f i rmer s teps .  In 
t h i s  s e n s e  he s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
The s l t u a t  i o n  here  , has changed s o  much f o r  the  
worse s i n c e  last June t h a t  . . . . Knowledge t h a t  
we a r e  prepared t o  proceed from words t o  deeds might 
be wholesome r a t h e r  than  the  r e ~ e r s e . ~  
H e  e n l a r g e d  upon t h i s  s t a t i n g  that, 
Up t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  our words and p ro tes t s  have 
been s t r o n g ,  our  deeds conspicuous by t h e i r  absence. 
I b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  d e s i r e d  r e s u l t  is more l i k e l y  t o  
be achieved i f  it now becomes prac t icable  t o  adopt 
e x a c t l y  t h e  oppos i te  procedure. 5 
R e f e r r i n g  t o  h i s  new found a t t i t u d e  of f i r m  measures aga ins t  
Japan he s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
I t  would be impossible t o  over-estimate the 
seriousness of t h e  e f f e c t  of the r e a l i z a t i o n  of 
r e c e n t l y  announced pol ic ies  upon our posi t ion vis-a- 
v i s  t h e  Japanese Government . . . . These considera- 
t i o n s  se rve  t o  emphasize the importance of fu r the r  
and e a r l y  a c t i o n  t o  bring it home forcibly t o  t h i s  
country t h a t  we a r e  not disposed t o  look on while 
t h e  p o l i c i e s  envisaged i n  these statements a r e  
t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  action.1 
Cra ig ie  then, began the period with the hope that the 
t e n s i o n  e x i s t i n g  between the two Powers could be a l l ev ia ted  
i f  B r i t a i n  were t o  take such s teps  a s  were possible t h a t  
would impress upon a l l  leve ls  of Japanese the s i n c e r i t y  of 
B r i t i s h  i n t e n t i o n s  as they had been expressed. This l i n e  he 
pursued not  only because it f i t t e d  in to  the framework of 
B r i t i s h  po l i cy  vis-a-vis both Japan and China, but a l s o  
because he had f e l t  t h a t  it d id  indeed have some chance of 
success .  H i s  views of whioh course of ac t ion  Bri ta in should 
pursue as regards  Japan changed only a f t e r  changes i n  the 
Japanese leadership  and subsequent statements which defined 
Japanese aims i n  such a manner as t o  leave no doubt t h a t  i f  
t h e s e  were accomplished, Br i t i sh  In te res t s  would s u f f e r  
seve re ly .  While Japanese policy changes seem t o  be the pr i -  
mary reason f o r  t h i s  about face i n  h i s  views, it should not 
be overlooked t h a t  Craigie,  many times having emphasized 
t h a t  i f  r e t a l i a t o r y  ac t ion  were t o  be taken it should be 
done only i n  conjunction wlth the  United States .  probably 
found it a b i t  e a s i e r  t o  come t o  h i s  new viewpoint s ince,  a s  
shown i n  previous chapters. the United Sta tes  was shorlnq 
s i g n s  of s t i f f e n i n g  i n  its a t t i t u d e  toward Japan and hence 
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~ o s s i b l y  ~ 0 0 p e r a t i ~  with Br i ta in  i n  some s o r t  of r e t a l i a -  
t i o n .  But it should be s t ressed  t h a t  h i s  s h i f t  i n  a t t i t u d e  
was brought about Primarily as a r e s u l t  of h i s  reaching the  
conclus ion  t h a t  B r i t i s h  policy as he had understood it 
earlier, did not  stand any chance of success against  the new 
Japanese l i n e .  Hence h i s  change i n  views represented a 
change t o  an a l t e r n a t e  policy which might s t i l l  accomplish 
t h e  same ends which the  e a r l i e r  policy had been designed t o  
a t t a i n .  
CHAPTER VI 
CRAIG IE VERSUS E3R.R 
Both S i r  Roger Cralgie and S i r  A. Clark Kerr during 
t h e  per iod  under consideration attempted t o  pursue a course 
of a c t i o n  which would i n  t h e i r  opinion maintain and protect  
a r i t i s h  I n t e r e s t s  i n  China and the  Far East as a whole. A s  
each was operat ing i n  a d i f fe ren t  environment, t h a t  is, 
under .p ressu re  from e i t h e r  the  Chinese or  Japanese Govern- 
ment, they  necessar i ly  advocated act ions which while being 
d i r e c t e d  toward the  common end, were i n  many cases contra- 
d i c t o r y  o r  incompatible. Their view of act ions o r  pol ic ies  
tended t o  be colored by the views of or s i t u a t i o n  within the  
country t o  which they were assigned. 
A s  a n  example of t h i s ,  Craigie i n  mid-October 1938 
when commenting on t h e  Munich Conference s tated tha t  he, 
. . . has formed the opinion t h a t  the  Munich Set t le -  
ment has had a sa lu tary  influence here . . . Cbecausel 
most i n f l u e n t i a l  c i r c l e s  would have liked. t o  see the  
continuance i n  Europe of a s t a t e  of anxiety and dis-  
cord,  and prospect of ea r l~~appeasement  is looked 
upon with some dismay . . . 
Elaborat ing upon t h i s  he fu r the r  s t a t ed  tha t  the,  
. . . f ee l ing  which prevai ls  most widely is one 
of concern l e s t  policy of successful appeasement i n  
Europe may leave Japan ( w i t h  her Anti-Cornintern Pact)  
somewhat i n  the a i r  . . . 2 
However Kerr disagreed, stating : 
The e f f e c t  of Munich accord on foreign opinions 
as seen  from here i s  tha t  perfidious Albion has been 
t r u e  t o  form and l e t  her f r iends  down again . . . . 
The Japanese reac t ion  ( I  speak subject t o  contradic- 
t i o n  from Tokyo) Is tha t  we a r e  prepared t o  put up 
wi th  almost any indigni ty r a the r  than f igh t  . . . . 
The r e s u l t  is t h a t ,  a l l  i n  a l l ,  our prest ige is  a t  a  
low ebb i n  t h e  East and anything which could be con- 
s t r u e d  as a s ign  of weakness or of a  lack of ser ious 
de terminat ion  t o  maintain our posit ion in  the E a s t  
m y  have consequences f a r  beyond shangha ie l  
By e a r l y  August of 1938 the Chinese Government w a s  
becoming increas ingly  in teres ted  i n  reaching some agreement 
wi th  Japan which would bring peace. With t h i s  end i n  mind 
Kerr had been approached by the  Chinese Minister of Foreign 
A f f a i r s  who, 
. . . asked whether i n  e i t h e r  event @al l  of Hankow 
o r  i t ' s  success fu l  defenca H i s  Majesty s Government 
would be wi l l ing  i n  concert w i t h  United Sta tes  and 
French Governments (he excluded R u s s i a )  t o  address 
simultaneously t o  the  Chinese and Japanese Governments 
n o t e s  (no t  necessar i ly  ident ic  but i n  generally s imi la r  
terms)  o f fe r ing  good off ices  of the three Powers t o  
br ing  about a peaceful settlement of the present 
s t r u g g l e .  2 
Cra lg ie  noting the  e f fec t  of such a  de'marche on 
Japan, had objected t o  the  Chinese proposal s t a t i n g  t h a t ,  
Main d i f f i c u l t y  I see i n  Chinese proposal i s  t h a t  
any pub l i c  o r  abrupt of fer  of good o f f i ces  by two or 
t h r e e  Powers ac t ing  e i t h e r  Jo in t ly  or  simultaneously 
is  bound t o  be re jec ted  by Japan a s  connoting an 
e x e r c i s e  of jo in t  pressure . . . . Only i f  the way 
had been very carefu l ly  and pr ivately prepared i n  
advance would there be any chance of Anglo-bmerican 
mediat ion proving acceptable and my present bel ief  
is t h a t ,  if the re  is  t o  be an o f fe r  of good of f ices  
from t h i s  quar ter .  Japanese Government would r e f e r  
t h a t  it should be e i t h e r  Br i t i sh  or  American. E 
Objecting on a d i f f e r e n t  l i n e  he s t a t ed  tha t .  "A 
f u r t h e r  ob jec t ion  is  t h a t  any such communication a t  t h i s  
s t a g e  is l i k e l y  t o  be regarded by Japanese Government a s  
evidence t h a t  China is nearing the end of her  tether.tr2 
Noting t h a t  t h e  Foreign Office seemed t o  be leaning 
toward a course of a c t i o n  such as Craigie had proposed as 
rega rds  t h e  Chinese proposal, Kerr argued t h a t ,  
The Chinese have never contemplated anything but 
a p u b l i c  d e h r c h e  made simultaneously t o  themselves 
and t h e  Japanese, simultaneous act ion being intended 
t o  cloak t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  came from them- 
s e l v e s  . . . . A s  I see it the present plan is  t o  
r e s t r i c t  the  demarche t o  something i n  the nature of 
. . . Good off i c e 3  t o  make it i n  regard t o  Japan 
only and t o  go about it pr ivately without giving 
i t ,  i n  any clear-cut way, the force of p a r r a l l e l  
a c t i o n  by the  three  democracies.3 
A s  t o  the  e f f e c t  t h i s  might have on the Chinese, he 
s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
I doubt whether as a f i r s t  reply t o  t h e i r  pro- 
p o s a l  t h i s  would commend i t s e l f  t o  the Chinese and 
I should not l i k e  t o  put it t o  them unless it i s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  owing t o  American jibbing p a r a l l e l  
a c t i o n  is ruled out f o r  t o  the Chinese it would be 
J u s t  another  f l a t  disappointment of t h e i r  hopes t h a t  
they  may count upon H s MaJestyrs Government f o r  
support  i n  some form. t 
However Craigie pursuing h i s  views fur ther ,  f e l t  t h a t  
t h e ,  
JaWneSe Government a r e  anxious fo r  peace and I 
should say disposed t o  accept good off ices  from t h e  
r i g h t  quar te r .  It would be a l l  the  more unfortunate I f  an unsuccessful mope were t o  be made a t  t h i s  
juncture.  Difficulty about an Anglo-French-American 
o f f e r  of good off ices  is  tha t .  i n  Japanese eyes, it 
would emanate from the three  which (excluding Soviet 
m s s i a )  a r e  pre-eminent as China's friends and Japan's 
enemies . . . I believe Japan would strongly prefer  
even tua l  good off i ces  and even mediation from s ingle  
power. If however there is  t o  be a combination he 
most e f f e c t i v e  one would be an Anglo-German one. 1 
Kerr f u r t h e r  pressing h i s  viewpoint s ta ted  t ha t ,  
. . . what I should now l i k e  t o  be able  t o  t e l l  
Chinese is one of two things: . . . (1) That we and 
t h e  Americans a r e  wil l ing when the time comes t o  a c t  
ton t h e  suggestion of good offices) . . . and do not 
exclude p o s s i b i l i t y  of a subsequent declarat ion of 
po l i cy  i n  the  event of f a i l u r e  a s  a warning t o  
Japan . . . or ( 2 )  t h a t  a common l i n e  of ac t ion  can- 
no t  be agreed upon with Americans . . . 2 
Contradicting Kerr, Cralgie said t h a t  it was his, 
. . . view that o f f e r  of good off ices  i n  the manner pro- 
posed by t h e  Chinese Gwernment h a s  no chance a t  a l l  of 
acceptance.lf3 And. he fu r the r  s ta ted ,  I1For a Br i t i sh  
i n i t i a t i v e  t o  have any chance of success a prerequisi te  is 
11 
4 
some aasing of tension i n  Anglo-Japanese re la t ions  . . . 
adding t h a t ,  "1 am anxious t o  avoid s l i gh t e s t  sign of 
Prec ip i tancy.  fl 
5 
Both Craigie and Kerr i n  attempting tonBmuver any 
a c t i o n s  such as Bri ta in  might take, i n  such a manner s o  as 
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t o  p resen t  them i n  as favorable a l i g h t  a s  possible t o  the  
r e s p e c t i v e  Governments t o  which they were assigned, were of 
course  merely performing the du t i e s  of t h e i r  posts. However 
i n  s o  doing,  they thereby tended t o  minimize the attendant 
e f f e c t s  upon o r  reac t ions  of the country t o  which t h e i r  
oppos i t e  was assigned. This point can again be I l l u s t r a t e d  
i n  t h e i r  r e spec t ive  a t t i t u d e s  on the degree t o  which Br i t a in  
should co-operate with Japan i n  occupied areas of China. 
Kerr of course being highly skept ica l  as t o  the  benefi ts  t o  
be de r ived  from such co-operation while a t  the same time 
anxious l e s t  something be done t o  a l iena te  China. Craigie 
on t h e  o t h e r  hand f e l t  such ac t ion  t o  be not only benef ic ia l  
bu t  a l s o  t h e  only prac t icable  course open t o  the  Bri t ish.  
With t h i s  i n  mind Craigie i n  l a t e  August of 1938 
suggested t h a t ,  
. . . I propose t o  say at  our next interview 
b i t h  t h e  Japanese Minister f o r  Foreign ~ f f a i r 9  
t h a t ,  pruvided our i n t e r e s t s  a r e  respected, we 
a r e  q u i t e  prepared t o  co-operate i n  the sense i n  
which we understood t h e  word and on the understand- 
ing  t h a t  our col laborat ion is t o  be f o r  the benefi t  
and not  t o  the detriment of China.l 
Disapprming of t h i s ,  Kerr s ta ted .  
I much doubt if any form of Anglo-Jananese co-opera- 
t i o n  i n  occupied areas  i n  the present circumstances 
could be t o  the  benef i t  and not t o  the detriment of 
China. Any s ign  of such co-opemtlon would na tura l ly  
be h a i l e d  i n  China as betrayal  of our pledges t o  t h i s  
country.  1 
I n  answer t o  Kerr, Craigie s ta ted  t h a t  a 
. . . f i e l d  i n  which I presume Ico-operationf 
might prove f r u f  t f u l  would be i n  use of our influence 
t o  secure  a just  peace. Recourse t o  Br i t i sh  good 
o f f i c e s  I bel ieve t o  be one of Minister f o r  Foreign 
A f f a i r ' s  objec t ives  provided t h a t  some means can be 
found t o  reduce exis t ing  tension between the two 
c o u n t r i e s .  2 
Kerr however disagreed with t h i s  saying t h a t ,  
While I apprec ia te  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  which S i r  R. 
Cra ig ie  f i n d s  himself i n  handling Japanese Minister 
f o r  Foreign Af fa i r s  I continue t o  think any form of 
co-operation which would be l ike ly  t o  s a t i s f y  
Japanese must be t o  the detriment of China and 
u l t i m a t e l y  damaging t o  our interests .3  
Noting t h e  f e a r  expressed by Kerr t h a t  co-operation 
would lead t o  f u r t h e r  Japanese Inroads upon Br i t i sh  
i n t e r e s t s ,  Craigie  on September 2 dwelling on exactly tha t  
p o i n t ,  s t a t e d  : 
. . . I a m  convinced . . . t h a t  unless our 
a u t h o r i t i e s  can ( i n  an e n t i r e l y  unoff ic ia l  way) 
work with Japanese ( i f  and when the l a t t e r  come 
halfway t o  meet them) i n  jury t o  our i n t e r e s t s  w i l l  
p rogress ive ly  increase beyond anything they at 
p resen t  contemplate. Absence of collaboration has 
been a t  root  of many of our d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  the  
p a s t  and if it is t o  be o f f i c i a l l y  encouraged 
w i l l  end by b e i w  fatal  t o  our whole posit ion i n  
occupied ~ h i n a . 4  
Kerr was not ,  however, convinced by Craigie 1 s argu- 
ments t h a t  co-operation would be beneficial .  With t h i s  i n  
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mind he mmned UP h i s  views of Japenese alms s ta t ing  t h a t ,  
We here  f e e l  it is a matter of de l ibera te  policy 
on t h e  p a r t  of Japanese Government t o  use pretext of 
m i l i t a r y  necess i ty  t o  squeeze us and t o  hold us up 
t o  blackmail. Local Japanese off l c i a l s  make no 
s e c r e t  of i n t e n t i o n  t o  reduce European and American 
in f luence  i n  China and t h i s  is  the way it is being 
d0ne.l  
Cra ig ie  s t i l l  pursuing h i s  same l i n e  of reasoning 
recognized t h a t  although Kerr might be correct  i n  h i s  
accessment of Japanese intent ions the Br i t i sh  a t  tha t  time 
had l i t t l e  choice but t o  follow the l i n e  he had suggested. 
Thus as he put  it on August 27, 
If we exclude method of protection by mil i tary 
a c t i o n  and recognize r i s k s  and disadvantages inherent 
i n  any system of economic r e p r i s a l  conclusion seems 
t o  be inescapable t h a t  we must miss no opportunity 
of a r ranging  t h e i r  D r i t i s h  in te res t s  i n  China') 
p r o t e c t i o n  by cooperative ac t ion  with Japan. That 
i n  s o  doing we can ( i n  the  circumstances of toda ) 
b e s t  s e r v e  i n t e r e s t s  of China is my firm be l i e f .  5 
Although Craigie and Kerr did agree on the desired 
ends t o  be a t t a i n e d  through execution of Br i t i sh  policy i n  
t h e  a r e a  they d i f f e r e d  widely i n  t h e i r  view of the means 
by which t h e  ends should be reached, Their views on overa l l  
a r i t i sh - Japanese  co-operation i l l u s t r a t e d  t h i s  t o  a degree, 
but  an examination of t h i s  same general  topic  although In a 
much narrower frame of reference,  points t h i s  up more 
c l e a r l y .  When down t o  the  l e v e l  of negotiations f o r  s p e c i f i c  
and l i m i t e d  objec t ives  Craigie tended t o  see the i ssue  from 
I I b i d . ,  pp. 49-50, 
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a broader  viewpoint while Kerr, perhaps because the small 
d e t a i l s  did a f f e c t  h i s  Post and posi t ion more d i rec t ly ,  
proved t o  be nore r e luc tan t  t o  pa r t i c ipa te  i n  any give and 
t a k e  process ,  viewing the  undertaking from a narrower frame 
of r e f e r e n c e .  
By way of i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  Craigie, i n  the  midst of 
negotiations wi th  t h e  Japanese aimed a t  a lessening of 
Anglo- Japanese d i f  f l c u l t  l e s ,  had i n  mid-September 1938 
s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
I r e a l i z e  t h a t  there  a r e  numy d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  the  
way of acceptance of two conditions named by Minister 
for Foreign A f f a i r s  f o r  r e s to ra t ion  of f u l l  Municipal 
Counci 1 a u t h o r i t y  i n  Hongkew and Yangtzepoo Bhanghai 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  settlement1 but I hope t h a t  t h i s  con- 
s t r u c t i v e  proposal w i l l  be considered not only from 
t h e  a n g l e  of l o o a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  but a l s o  i n  the l i g h t  
of g e n e r a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s i t a a t i o n  and importance of 
g e t t i n g  our r e l a t i o n s  with t h i s  country on a b e t t e r  
foo t ing .  I a l s o  believe a prompt settlement of 
Northern area @f the  settlement} question on bas is  
of Min i s t e r  f o r  Foreign Affa i rs f  proposal would 
open up b e t t e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  settlement of= 
o t h e r  outstanding d i f f  1 c u l t i e s . l  
Kerr however r e fe r r ing  t o  these same proposals s t a t ed  
t h a t ,  
. . I n  regard t o  the Northern d i s t r i c t  I main- 
t a i n  t h a t  t h e  Japanese have no va l id  excuse f o r  not 
at once handing it  back t o  Municipal Council control  
Without condi t ions.  The increase of the Japanese 
element i n  the  pol ice and i ~ u n l c i p l  Administrat ion, 
and t h e  con t ro l  of t h e  Court a r e  extraneous a f f a i r s  
which have no connection w i t h  the  Northern D i s t r i c t  
q u e s t i o n  and the  Japanese have no r igh t  t o  l i n k  
them toge the r .  I must repeat that Japanese l i f e  
and proper ty  a r e  not i n  danger south of the  creek 
and t h e r e  is no reason why they should be i n  danger 
n o r t h  of t h e  creek if the Council's authori ty  were 
r e s t o r e d  . . . A s  regards the  Police,  the Council 
have gone a long way t o  meet the Japanese demands - 
as f a r  as they f e e l  they a r e  jus t i f ied  i n  going a t  
p r e s e n t  t ak ing  i n t o  consideration the other nat ional  
i n t e r e s t s  involved and the strong opposition from 
o t h e r  na t ions  besides ourselves t o  allowing the 
Japanese t o  g a i n  a dominating posi t ion i n  the Set t le-  
ment. 1 
Cra ig ie ,  i n  cont ras t  t o  Kerr, f e l t  t h a t  perhaps the 
Japanese d i d  have a v a l i d  point t o  t h e i r  arguments f o r  a 
l a r g e r  v o i c e  i n  Sett lement a f f a i r s .  A s  he put it, 
I f i n d  it d i f f i c u l t  t o  agree . . . t ha t  questions 
of Court and Po l i ce  have no r e l a t i o n  t o  the question 
of r e s t o r a t i o n  of Municipal Councills authori ty  i n  
t h e  Northern D i s t r i c t  , . . . With 30,000 Japanese 
i n  Hongkew I cannot help doubting whether the 
Japanese apprehensions a r e  al together  unjus t i f ied ,  
o r  whether something more cannot be done t o  meet 
them on t h e  Court i ssue  without endangering inter-  
n a t  l o n a l  cont ro l .  
Moreover, he cant  inued, 
It has always seemed t o  me somewhat anomalous 
t h a t  nominees of old regime should be s t i l l  function- 
ing  I n  a n  a r e a  completely surrounded by Japanese 
t r o o p s  and dea l ing  with cases inevitably touching 
t h e  I n t e r e s t s  of a rea  under Japanese control. We 
s h a l l  make l i t t l e  progress with Northern area 
q u e s t i o n  unt 11 Japanese have been s a t i s f  led t h a t  
an imY r t ia l  cour t  is functioning i n  the Set t le -  ment. 
Kerr had object ions of a p o l i t i c a l ,  jur id ica l  and 
P r a c t i c a l  na ture  t o  the establishment of a new system of 
 bid., - pp. 111-112. 
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pro-Japanese cou r t s  i n  t h e  Settlement. A s  t o  the po l i t i c a l  
o b j e c t i o n  he  s t a t e d :  
S ince  t h e  Courts function i n  the Settlement by 
v i r t u e  of a n  i n t e rna t i ona l  agreement concluded wi th  
t h e  Cen t r a l  Government, acceptance of the t ransfer  
of j u r i s d i c t i o n  from the  appointees of t h a t  Govern- 
ment t o  those  of a succession Government is a s t ep  
w i th  s e r i o u s  implicat ions which I should find it 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  j u s t i f y  u n t i l  such succession Govern- 
ment had a t  l e a s t  establ ished effect ive control and 
a r e g u l a r l y  funct ioning system of judicial  adminis- 
t r a t f  on i n  t h e  neighboring areas.  1 
A s  t o  t h e  ob jec t ions  of a ju r id ica l  nature he s tated t h a t ,  
S ince  they  [the establ ished courtd have a 
J u r i d i c a l l y  sound basis t h e i r  decisions a re  legally 
v a l i d  and a r e  s o  recognized by foreign courts and 
a l s o  by c i v i l  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  matters of personal 
s t a t u s  &c. I f  t h e  Courts a r e  simply turned over 
t o  t h e  so-ca l led  'Reformed Government (which has 
as y e t  no exis tence  except on paper and no Judicial  
machinery whatsoever) the  jur id ica l  bssis d i  appears 
and t h e  a c t s  of t he  Courts have no va l id i ty ,  E 
A s  r ega rd s  p r a c t i c a l  object ions,  
. with  pro-Japanese judges working i n  conjunc- 
t i o n  wi th  t h e  Japanese Special Service Section the 
Courts  would be a powerful instrument f o r  tyranny 
over  t h e  non-co-operating portion of the population 
. . &hug There is  only one sa t i s fac tory  solution 
and t h a t  i s  t o  allow the present Courts and Judges 
t o  cont inue  funct ioning u n t i l  e i the r  the Central 
Government disappears  or  a t  l e a s t  a successor Govern- 
ment i n  t h i s  a r e a  has become so  f i r m l y  established as 
t o  be gene ra l1  accepted as the facto Government 
of t h e  region.  5 
The reasonlng of Kerr is  more tha t  of the man on t h e  
spo t  where t h e  a c t i o n  i s ,  who 1s forced t o  evaluate and deal  
with  hard r e a l i t i e s .  con t r a s t ,  Craigie being fur ther  
removed from t h e  a c t u a l  scene of t he  tensions and conf l ic t  
is more a b l e  t o  s i t  back and appraise  t he  s i t ua t ion  i n  t o t o  
- -' 
and is t h e r e b y  l e s s  concerned with the  small and deta i led 
r e s u l t s ,  some of which may be loca l ly  bad, of any agreement 
t h a t  might reached.  
A s  i f  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  Kerr fu r the r  s ta ted  tha t ,  
I s e e  no r ea son  why we should give away t o  
" - -  Japanese  eve ry th ing  we have securGd . . . during 
t h e s e  past months. 
A s  we c l e a r l y  cannot make any headway a t  present 
I recommend tha t  as f a r  as possible these matters 
be t e m p o r a r i l y  l e f t  i n  cold storage. I f  conditions 
i n  Europe d e t e r i o r a t e  the  Japanese w i l l  sooner or  
l a t e r  s e t t l e  t h e s e  and o ther  i s sues  under threat  
of f o r c e ;  i f  cond i t  ons improve we may be able t o  
t a k e  a f i r m e r  l i n e .  1 
Disag ree ing  wi th  t h i s  l i n e  of thought, Craigie said:  
It is  i n  any case  a mistake t o  believe tha t  such 
q u e s t i o n s  can be put  i n t o  'cold s toraget  and l a t e r  
emerge i n  t h e  same condition. For t h i s  the  l oca l  
t empera tu re  is f a r  t o o  high.2 
C r a l g i e ,  summing up t h e  reasoning which had led him 
t o  assume h i s  s t a n d  on the  i s sues  of co-operation with the 
Japanese I n  China as opposed t o  t h e  views of Kerr, s ta ted  
t h a t ,  
More than anything e l s e  it [getting the  Japanese 
t o  meet B r i t i s h  desiderata> is a question of con- 
v i n c i n g  t h e  Japanese Government t h a t  our au thor i t i es  
a r e  r eady  t o  meet t he  Japanese au tho r i t i e s  i n  the  
I I b i d . ,  p.  103. 
-
1 82 r i g h t  spirit . . . 
The o v e r a l l  pol icy of Bri ta in vis-a-vis China and 
&pan seemed t o  Kerr t o  be badly I n  need of a general over- 
hauling. A s  he  put  it, 
AS I s e e  it our whole posit ion in  t h i s  Country is 
fast s l i p p i n g  from under us, par t ly  on account of 
i n a c t i o n  forced upon us by s i tuat ion in Europe, but 
more because of genera l  indecision of our policy which, 
as seen  h e r e ,  is governed by fea r  of ~ a ~ a n . 2  
=press ing  h i s  anxie ty ,  he continued s ta t ing ,  
I submit t h e  time has come t o  decide once and f o r  
a l l  whether w e  a r e  going t o  do something for  the 
Chinese which w i l l  be of immediate practical  use t o  
them o r  t o  r e t r e a t  from engagements entered into a t  
Geneva and p i n  our f a i t h  on the assurances of Japan. 
For myself I regard these assurances as  worthless 
whi le  I cons ider  the  keeping of the goodwill of the 
Chinese, even perhaps a t  the  price of some temporary 
f i n a n c i a l  l o s s ,  t o  be something of r ea l  and lasting 
v a l u e  of e s s e n t i a l  importance t o  our whole position 
i n  t h i s  country i n  future.3 
He a l s o  seemed t o  f e e l  that  the Japanese Government 
communique of November 2 and Prince Konoyets broadcast of 
November 3 should have de f in i t e ly  crushed a l l  hopes of 
-10- Japanese co-operat ion. These announcements, as  Kerr 
put it, 
. . . seem t o  me t o  be of capi ta l  importance in 
t h a t  they  should d i s p e l  a l l  doubts about the rea l  
i n t e n t i o n s  of t h e  Japanese . . . . I think that 
this should be enough t o  deter  us from again 'taking 
t h e  Japanese Government a t  the i r  word1 . and t o  
demolish any hopes t h a t  by 1 co-operationt w i t h  Japan 
it may be p o s s i b l e  t o  Preserve our in te res t s  i n  
China .l 
Even though as shown i n  another chapter these 
Japanese announcements of November 2 and 3 did seem t o  be 
t h e  t u n i n g  p o i n t  I n  Cra lg ie l s  vlews from pressing f o r  
~ n g l o -  Japanese co-operatlon t o  the advocacy of re ta l ia tory  
measures, he  was never the less  unable t o  allow the above 
mentioned s t a t ements  of Kerr t o  pass unchallenged. He thus 
s t a t e d  t h a t ,  
A s  r ega rds  S i r  A. Clark Kerrls observations we 
have never  of course tpinned our f a i t h '  i n  Japanese 
a s s u r a n c e s  because,  despi te  the s ince r i t i e s  (sic1 
w i t h  which I b e l i e v e  them t o  have been originally 
made, d i f f  l c u l t i e s  i n  the way of implementation 
were obvious from t h e  start. But i n  the absence 
of any  p r a c t i c a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  policy, it seemed 
b e s t  t o  t a k e  t h e  Japanese Government a t  t h e i r  word. 
Thus a l though both Craigie and Kerr did have the same 
end in mind, tha t  of protect ing Bri t ish in teres ts  i n  China, 
they d i f f e r e d  on t h e  proper methods t o  be used t o  gain tha t  
end. Kerr,  by v i r t u e  of h i s  posit ion as the Chief S r i t i sh  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t o  China, was grea t ly  ooncerned with the 
e f f e c t  on t h e  Chinese and thereby on Anglo-Chinese relations 
of any and a l l  s t e p s  taken vis-a-vis the Japanese t o  safe- 
guard B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s .  Craigie by contrast was p r i m r i l y  
concerned wi th  maneuvering Br i ta in  in to  such a position a s  
t o  a l l o w  a n  Anglo-Japanese agreement w i t h  respect t o  the 
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safety of B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s  i n  China t o  be successfully 
negot iated.  He was l i t t l e  concerned, a s  he was f a r  removed , 
from d e a l i n g  wi th  hi3lo-minese questions, with any locally 
damaging r e s u l t s  which mlght accrue from any Anglo-Japanese 
agreements 
The question of safeguarding Br i t i sh  interests  in  
China w a s  r e a l l y  t h e  only s ignif icant  issue which did touch 
with equa l  impact Upon the  a o t i ~ i t i e s  of both b a i g i e  and 
Kerr, as most o t h e r  i ssues  were exclusively within the 
domain of e i t h e r  Craigie or  Ken. 
It is impossible t o  say tha t  e i ther  man was correct 
or  i n c o r r e c t  i n  h i s  assessment of the proper course to  take. 
Each man w a s  probably correct  whether one judges from a 
narrow o r  broad point  of view a s  long as each man's view- 
point i s  confined t o  h i s  frame of reference, that is, his 
p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  na t ion  t o  which he was assigned. This dif-  
ference i n  views was however by l a t e  November or early 
December 1938 l a r g e l y  dissolved o w w  t o  the about face in  
thinking which Craigie  had experienced following the  
Japanese s ta tements  of policy of Nmember and 3, lg3'' 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
T u  t h e s i s  covered each of f ive aspects of Bri t ish 
pol icy  e a r l i e r  r e f e r r e d  t o ,  i n  some detai l .  1t should be 
noted t h a t  i n  t h e  Case of the first aspect mentioned, the 
pros and cons of extending a i d  t o  China or taking retai l la-  
tory  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  Japan, the question of which course of 
a c t i o n  t o  fo l low w a s  ult imately decided by which course 
~ f f e r e d  t h e  l e a s t  r e s i s t ance ,  t h a t  is, the least  r isk of 
war. This  was of course a logica l  choice as both courses 
were i n  t h e  end designed t o  accomplish essentially the same 
thing,  t h a t  being t h e  l imi ta t ion ,  i f  not outright blocking, 
of t h e  Japanese plans f o r  East Asia. Retaliatory action 
aga ins t  Japan became somewhat more at t ract ive t o  the Bri t ish 
a s  t h e  United S t a t e s  began t o  take a firmer l ine wi th  the 
former, bu t  while  consideration was given t h i s  l ine,  British 
ob l iga t ions  elsewhere combined with Srit i s h  wealmess in  the 
F a r  E a s t  e f f e c t i v e l y  ruled out such a course as long as the 
same end could possibly be galned with different means. 
The second aspect  of B r i t l s h  pollcy examined was 
whether B r i t a i n  o r  the United States was leading in  terns of 
the a c t i o n s  taken  by them vis-a-vis China and Japan. The 
S r l t l ~ h  were q u i t e  hes i t an t  t o  approach the united States 
regarding j o i n t  a c t i o n s  i n  the area f o r  fear of further 
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~ ~ O U S ~ W  t h e  l s o h t i o n i s t  Publ ic  and Congress, while a t  the  
same t i m e  being u r n i l l *  t o  take any s lgnif  icant  act ions 
might a r o u s e  the Japanese unless they be taken i n  
~ o n c e r t  wi th  the United S t a t e s*  The United States desired 
t h e  same s o r t  of a c t i o n s  as did  the Bri t i sh ,  however it did 
n o t  want aw a c t i o n s  taken t o  have the  appearance of being 
taken i n  c o n c e r t  with the  Bri t i sh .  The Bri t i sh  seemed t o  
f e e l  that t h e y  were s u b t l y  leading the  United States,  how- 
ever i n  terms of t h e  a c t i o n s  taken one Power did not clearly 
l e a d  t h e  other. 
The n e x t  p o i n t  s tudied was whether Britain was 
t r e a t e d  l e s s  well at  t h e  hands of Japan than the  United 
S t a t e s .  The B r f  t i s h  seemed t o  have a vague unexplained 
feelin3 that they w e r e  Ix l r ig  treated less we11 bnt, admitted 
that they could not pinpoint aw spe~ific instance. It 
imtaad seem %z, h a ~ r :  ttesn genera%& by lass courteous 
t ~ e a t ~ e n t  biw extend4 $he a i ? ; i s k  by Jaw1 than was given 
the iinfted States. yhfs of course could very well have been 
due greater potentfaf American power, nu& greater 
he r i c an  trade r l th  J ~ W D  and much ~reater (as contrasted 
American) -1tlsh interests in C411m. rhlch naturally 
tended to &ax mare into ~ a f l l s t  r l t h  3apnese atas 
L? Zhim* 
3"ne fourth aspect to be studied Crai4ie'B views 
and how and why $fie J c:hansed. maigie m a n  t h e  period 
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hopeful  t h a t  t h e  d i spu tes  Which Were occurring between the 
Japanese and B r i t i s h  could be amicably set t led to t h e  satis- 
f a c t i o n  of both s ides .  He was a l s o  hopeful that  Britain 
might be a b l e  t o  PI-Y an instrumental role in  aiding in 
t o  end t h e  conf l i c t  In China. He held these 
views t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  he was w i l l i n g  t o  submit t o  some of 
the  Japanese demands which had been leveled a t  the British, 
s ince  he had bel ieved the Japanese leaders t o  be sincere i n  
t h e i r  o f t  expressed d e s i r e s  t o  protect B r i t i s h  interests. 
However as t h e  leadership  changed and as  subsequent declara- 
t i o n s  of po l i cy  were issued which l e f t  no doubt as t o  
Japanese i n t e n t i o n s ,  Craigie did a  turnabout as regards the  
a t t i t u d e  he bel ieved should be taken toward that Government. 
He began then  t o  advocate r e t a l i a to ry  actions, which would 
i n  t h e  end have gained the same goal if by different means, 
t h a t  of p r o t e c t i o n  of B r i t i s h  in teres ts  in  China, as  would 
h i s  e a r l i e r  l i n e .  
The last  point  examined was the conflict between 
Craigie  and Kerr as t o  how best t o  insure the protection of 
B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s  i n  China. ~ 0 t h  were influenced in large 
degree by t h e  post they held and thence by considerations of 
how any proposed ac t ions  would af fec t  the nation t o  which 
they were acc red i t ed .  T h i s  b e i w  t h e  case, Kerr of course 
advocated more open and d i r e c t  a id t o  China while Craigie, 
by c o n t r a s t ,  urged care  i n  not overly arousln8 J a ~ n  to the 
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point  t h a t  B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t s  i n  China would be even nore 
n ever el^ damaged than  they had already been. 
Having examined these several  aspects of ~ ) r i t l ~ h  
i n  t h e  Far E a s t  from Awust 1938 t o  March of 1939 it 
seems f a i r  t o  conclude t h a t  Br i t i sh  policy revolved around 
t h e  c e n t r a l  ques t ion  of the  Proeection of the i r  interests in  
China. Her p o s i t i o n  i n  other areas of the world precluded 
t h e  employment of f o r c e f u l  means on a unilateral  basis. She 
thus  d e s i r e d  t o  g a i n  t h e  a i d  of the United States thereby 
compensating f o r  h e r  own weakness i n  the area, particularly 
as r e t a l i a t o r y  measures began t o  be given serious considera- 
t ion .  However lacking  the means t o  apply force or the 
wholehearted cooperation and a id  of the United States, 
B r i t a i n  at tempted t o  maintain the s ta tus  quo in  the hope 
e i t h e r  Japanese pol icy  would undergo a change for the better 
o r  that t h e  European s i t u a t i o n  would change s o  as t o  allow 
more freedom of a c t i o n  I n  t h e  Far  East. 
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